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Central Bank Design

Listed author(s):
  • Ricardo Reis

Starting with a blank slate, how could one design the institutions of a central bank for the United States? This paper explores the question of how to design a central bank, drawing on the relevant economic literature and historical experiences while staying free from concerns about how the Fed got to be what it is today or the short-term political constraints it has faced at various times. The goal is to provide an opinionated overview that puts forward the trade-offs associated with different choices and identifies areas where there are clear messages about optimal central bank design.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.27.4.17
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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/ds/2704/2704-0017_ds.zip
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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 27 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Pages: 17-44

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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:27:y:2013:i:4:p:17-44
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.27.4.17
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