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Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance

  • Gaballo, G.

This paper studies the social value of information about the future when agents are rationally inattentive. In a stylized OLG model of inflation the central bank (CB) can set money supply in response to the current price. The CB has perfect foresight about the future T shocks and releases this information to rationally inattentive agents. At the unique REE, individual and aggregate risks can increase with the release when the monetary conduct is not "tight enough" and agents are "not attentive enough" to the news. In particular, the shorter the T, the more attentive the agents must be to avoid perverse welfare effects, whereas the notion of "tight enough" remains invariant. In this sense, efficient communication requires effective monetary policy.

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File URL: http://www.banque-france.fr/uploads/tx_bdfdocumentstravail/DT416_01.pdf
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Paper provided by Banque de France in its series Working papers with number 416.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bfr:banfra:416
Contact details of provider: Postal: Banque de France 31 Rue Croix des Petits Champs LABOLOG - 49-1404 75049 PARIS
Web page: http://www.banque-france.fr/

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  1. Olivier J. Blanchard & Jean-Paul L’Huillier & Guido Lorenzoni, 2012. "News, Noise, and Fluctuations: An Empirical Exploration," Development Research Working Paper Series 09/2012, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
  2. Albert Marcet & Juan P. Nicolini, 2003. "Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1476-1498, December.
  3. Mackowiak, Bartosz Adam & Wiederholt, Mirko, 2007. "Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention," CEPR Discussion Papers 6243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Gaballo, G., 2012. "Private Uncertainty and Multiplicity," Working papers 387, Banque de France.
  5. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1103-1142, 07.
  6. Klaus Adam, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 24, Econometric Society.
  7. Ernesto Pasten, 2012. "Rational Inattention, Multi-Product Firms and the Neutrality of Money," 2012 Meeting Papers 346, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Paul Beaudry & Franck Portier, 2006. "Stock Prices, News, and Economic Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1293-1307, September.
  9. Nir Jaimovich & Sergio Rebelo, 2009. "Can News about the Future Drive the Business Cycle?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1097-1118, September.
  10. Marco Del Negro & Marc Giannoni & Christina Patterson, 2012. "The forward guidance puzzle," Staff Reports 574, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  11. Beaudry, Paul & Portier, Franck, 2004. "When Can Changes in Expectations Cause Business Cycle Fluctuations in Neo-Classical Settings?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4628, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Thomas Sargent & Noah Williams & Tao Zha, 2006. "The conquest of South American inflation," Working Paper 2006-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  13. Christopher A. Sims, 2006. "Rational Inattention: Beyond the Linear-Quadratic Case," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 158-163, May.
  14. Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
  15. Luis Gonzalo Llosa & Venky Venkateswaran, 2015. "Efficiency with Endogenous Information Choice," Working Papers 2015-44, Peruvian Economic Association.
  16. Jeffrey R. Campbell & Charles Evans & Jonas D. M. Fisher & Alejandro Justiniano, 2012. "Macroeconomic effects of Federal Reserve forward guidance," Working Paper Series WP-2012-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  17. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
  18. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  19. Manuel Amador & Pierre Olivier Weill, 2008. "Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare," 2008 Meeting Papers 390, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  20. C.J.M. Kool & D.L. Thornton, 2012. "How Effective Is Central Bank Forward Guidance?," Working Papers 12-05, Utrecht School of Economics.
  21. Clemens J.M. Kool & Daniel L. Thornton, 2012. "How effective is central bank forward guidance?," Working Papers 2012-063, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  22. Filip Matejka & Christopher A. Sims, 2011. "Discrete Actions in Information-Constrained Tracking Problems," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp441, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  23. Filip Matejka, 2010. "Rationally Inattentive Seller: Sales and Discrete Pricing," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp408, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  24. Sims, Christopher A., 2003. "Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 665-690, April.
  25. Mauro Roca, 2010. "Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," IMF Working Papers 10/91, International Monetary Fund.
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