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Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance

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  • Gaballo, G.

Abstract

This paper studies the social value of information about the future when agents are rationally inattentive. In a stylized OLG model of inflation the central bank (CB) can set money supply in response to the current price. The CB has perfect foresight about the future T shocks and releases this information to rationally inattentive agents. At the unique REE, individual and aggregate risks can increase with the release when the monetary conduct is not "tight enough" and agents are "not attentive enough" to the news. In particular, the shorter the T, the more attentive the agents must be to avoid perverse welfare effects, whereas the notion of "tight enough" remains invariant. In this sense, efficient communication requires effective monetary policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaballo, G., 2013. "Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance," Working papers 416, Banque de France.
  • Handle: RePEc:bfr:banfra:416
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    Cited by:

    1. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2018. "Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(9), pages 2477-2512, September.
    2. Eric Gaus, 2014. "Adaptive Learning, Heterogeneous Expectations and Forward Guidance," Working Papers 14-03, Ursinus College, Department of Economics.
    3. Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard, Lise & Seegmuller, Thomas, 2015. "Rational bubbles and macroeconomic fluctuations: The (de-)stabilizing role of monetary policy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 1-15.
    4. Tongkui Yu & Shu-Heng Chen, 2021. "Big Data, Scarce Attention and Decision-Making Quality," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 57(3), pages 827-856, March.
    5. Coenen, Günter & Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Nakov, Anton & Nardelli, Stefano & Persson, Eric & Strasser, Georg H., 2017. "Communication of monetary policy in unconventional times," CFS Working Paper Series 578, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    6. Kurt Graden Lunsford, 2018. "Understanding the Aspects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance," Working Papers (Old Series) 1815, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    7. Philippe Andrade & Gaetano Gaballo & Eric Mengus & Benoît Mojon, 2019. "Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 1-29, July.
    8. Paul Hubert & Fabien Labondance, 2016. "The effect of ECB forward guidance on policy expectations," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2016-30, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    9. Anna Agliari & Domenico Massaro & Nicolò Pecora & Alessandro Spelta, 2017. "Inflation Targeting, Recursive Inattentiveness, and Heterogeneous Beliefs," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(7), pages 1587-1619, October.
    10. Benoît Cœuré, 2017. "Central Bank Communication in a Low Interest Rate Environment," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 28(5), pages 813-822, November.
    11. Ippei Fujiwara & Yuichiro Waki, 2015. "Private news and monetary policy forward guidance or (the expected virtue of ignorance)," Globalization Institute Working Papers 238, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    12. Campbell, Jeffrey R., 2019. "Comment on “Can more public information raise uncertainty? The international evidence on forward guidance” by Michael Ehrmann, Gaetano Gaballo, Peter Hoffmann and Georg Strasser," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 113-117.
    13. Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Strasser, Georg, 2019. "Can more public information raise uncertainty? The international evidence on forward guidance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 93-112.
    14. Ryan Chahrour & Kyle Jurado, 2020. "Optimal Foresight," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1017, Boston College Department of Economics.
    15. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "Central Bank Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 17-44, Fall.
    16. Moustapha Daouda Dala & Isabelle Distinguin & Alain Sauviat, 2020. "What is the information value of bank's stress tests? An investigation using banks' bond split ratings," Working Papers hal-02475512, HAL.
    17. Kenza Benhima & Isabella Blengini, 2020. "Optimal Monetary Policy when Information is Market-Generated," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(628), pages 956-975.
    18. Krokida, Styliani-Iris & Makrychoriti, Panagiota & Spyrou, Spyros, 2020. "Monetary policy and herd behavior: International evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 386-417.
    19. Mackowiak, Bartosz Adam & Matejka, Filip & Wiederholt, Mirko, 2018. "Survey: Rational Inattention, a Disciplined Behavioral Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 13243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Bezerra Bisneto, João Lídio, 2016. "Communication policy with public uncertainty," Textos para discussão 431, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    21. Moustapha Daouda Dala & Isabelle Distinguin & Alain Sauviat, 2020. "What is the information value of bank's stress tests? An investigation using banks' bond split ratings," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 485-499.
    22. Kurt G. Lunsford, 2020. "Policy Language and Information Effects in the Early Days of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2899-2934, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information Acquisition; Central Bank Communication; Monetary Policy; Social Value of Information.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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