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Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance

Listed author(s):
  • Gaballo, G.

This paper studies the social value of information about the future when agents are rationally inattentive. In a stylized OLG model of inflation the central bank (CB) can set money supply in response to the current price. The CB has perfect foresight about the future T shocks and releases this information to rationally inattentive agents. At the unique REE, individual and aggregate risks can increase with the release when the monetary conduct is not "tight enough" and agents are "not attentive enough" to the news. In particular, the shorter the T, the more attentive the agents must be to avoid perverse welfare effects, whereas the notion of "tight enough" remains invariant. In this sense, efficient communication requires effective monetary policy.

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File URL: https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/working-paper_416_2013.pdf
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Paper provided by Banque de France in its series Working papers with number 416.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Handle: RePEc:bfr:banfra:416
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Banque de France 31 Rue Croix des Petits Champs LABOLOG - 49-1404 75049 PARIS

Web page: http://www.banque-france.fr/

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  1. Beaudry, Paul & Portier, Franck, 2007. "When can changes in expectations cause business cycle fluctuations in neo-classical settings?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 458-477, July.
  2. Laura L. Veldkamp, 2011. "Information Choice in Macroeconomics and Finance," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9621.
  3. Luca Colombo & Gianluca Femminis & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Information Acquisition and Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1438-1483.
  4. Marcet, Albert & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 1998. "Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning," CEPR Discussion Papers 1875, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  6. Jaimovich, Nir & Rebelo, Sérgio, 2006. "Can News About the Future Drive the Business Cycle?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Maćkowiak, Bartosz & Wiederholt, Mirko, 2009. "Optimal sticky prices under rational inattention," Working Paper Series 1009, European Central Bank.
  8. Gaballo, G., 2012. "Private Uncertainty and Multiplicity," Working papers 387, Banque de France.
  9. Luis Gonzalo Llosa & Venky Venkateswaran, 2015. "Efficiency with Endogenous Information Choice," Working Papers 2015-44, Peruvian Economic Association.
  10. Beaudry, Paul & Portier, Franck, 2003. "Stock Prices, News and Economic Fluctuations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3844, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Marc Giannoni & Christina Patterson & Marco Del Negro, 2016. "The Forward Guidance Puzzle," 2016 Meeting Papers 143, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  12. Jean-Paul L'Huillier & Guido Lorenzoni & Olivier J. Blanchard, 2009. "News, Noise and Fluctuations: An Empirical Exploration," 2009 Meeting Papers 99, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  13. Ryan Chahrour, 2012. "Public Communication and Information Acquisition," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 803, Boston College Department of Economics.
  14. Pasten, Ernesto & Schoenle, Raphael, 2016. "Rational inattention, multi-product firms and the neutrality of money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1-16.
  15. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
  16. Ricardo Reis, 2011. "When Should Policymakers Make Announcements?," 2011 Meeting Papers 122, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  17. Filip Matejka, 2010. "Rationally Inattentive Seller: Sales and Discrete Pricing," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp408, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  18. repec:bin:bpeajo:v:44:y:2012:i:2012-01:p:1-80 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1103-1142, 07.
  20. Jeffrey R. Campbell & Charles L. Evans & Jonas D. M. Fisher & Alejandro Justiniano, 2012. "Macroeconomic effects of Federal Reserve forward guidance," Working Paper Series WP-2012-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  21. Sims, Christopher A., 2003. "Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 665-690, April.
  22. Klaus Adam, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 116, Netherlands Central Bank.
  23. Manuel Amador & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2008. "Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare," NBER Working Papers 14255, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Kool, Clemens J. M. & Thornton, Daniel L., 2015. "How Effective Is Central Bank Forward Guidance?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 97(4), pages 303-322.
  25. Ryan Chahrour & Manoj Atolia, 2015. "Intersectoral Linkages, Diverse Information, and Aggregate Dynamics in a Neoclassical Model," 2015 Meeting Papers 398, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  26. Baeriswyl, Romain & Cornand, Camille, 2010. "The signaling role of policy actions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(6), pages 682-695, September.
  27. Thomas Sargent & Noah Williams & Tao Zha, 2006. "The Conquest of South American Inflation," NBER Working Papers 12606, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Gaetano Gaballo & Eric Mengus & Benoït Mojon & Philippe Andrade, 2016. "Forward guidance and heterogenous beliefs," 2016 Meeting Papers 1182, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  29. Filip Matejka & Christopher A. Sims, 2011. "Discrete Actions in Information-Constrained Tracking Problems," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp441, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  30. Straub, Ludwig & Ulbricht, Robert, 2015. "Endogenous Uncertainty and Credit Crunches," TSE Working Papers 15-604, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  31. Christopher A. Sims, 2006. "Rational Inattention: Beyond the Linear-Quadratic Case," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 158-163, May.
  32. Romain Baeriswyl, 2011. "Endogenous Central Bank Information and the Optimal Degree of Transparency," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7(2), pages 85-111, June.
  33. Mauro F Roca, 2010. "Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," IMF Working Papers 10/91, International Monetary Fund.
  34. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
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