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Learning over the Business Cycle: Policy Implications

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  • Iovino, Luigi
  • Angeletos, George-Marios
  • La'O, Jennifer

Abstract

This paper studies the policy implications of the endogeneity of information about the state of the economy. The business cycle can be made less noisy, and more efficient, by incentivizing firms to vary their pricing and production decisions more with their beliefs about the state of the economy. This calls for countercyclical taxes complemented by a monetary policy that “leans against the wind.†The optimal policies trade-off allocative efficiency for informational efficiency.

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  • Iovino, Luigi & Angeletos, George-Marios & La'O, Jennifer, 2020. "Learning over the Business Cycle: Policy Implications," CEPR Discussion Papers 14577, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14577
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Lubik & Christian Matthes & Elmar Mertens, 2023. "Indeterminacy and Imperfect Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 49, pages 37-57, July.
    2. Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul & Fabian Winkler, 2021. "The natural rate of interest through a hall of mirrors," BIS Working Papers 974, Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Huo, Zhen & Pedroni, Marcelo, 2023. "Dynamic information aggregation: Learning from the past," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 107-124.
    4. Jonathan J Adams, 2024. "Optimal Policy Without Rational Expectations: A Sufficient Statistic Solution," Working Papers 001011, University of Florida, Department of Economics.
    5. Jonathan J Adams, 2020. "Moderating Macroeconomic Bubbles Under Dispersed Information," Working Papers 001005, University of Florida, Department of Economics.
    6. Adams, Jonathan J., 2023. "Moderating noise-driven macroeconomic fluctuations under dispersed information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    7. Thomas Lubik & Christian Matthes & Elmar Mertens, 2023. "Indeterminacy and Imperfect Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 49, pages 37-57, July.
    8. Huang, Wenli & Liu, Wenqiong & Lu, Lei & Mu, Congming, 2023. "Hedge funds trading strategies and leverage," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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