Delay and deadlines: freeriding and information revelation in partnerships
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Arthur Campbell & Florian Ederer & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2014. "Delay and Deadlines: Freeriding and Information Revelation in Partnerships," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 163-204, May.
References listed on IDEAS
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
- Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 259-276.
- Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2011.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 632-663, April.
- Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2009. "Collaborating," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1695, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2009.
- Johannes Horner & Alessandro Bonatti, 2009. "Collaborating," 2009 Meeting Papers 1019, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ufuk Akcigit & Qingmin Liu, 2011.
"The Role of Information in Competitive Experimentation,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000321, David K. Levine.
- Ufuk Akcigit & Qingmin Liu, 2011. "The Role of Information in Competitive Experimentation," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Ufuk Akcigit & Qingmin Liu, 2011. "The Role of Information in Competitive Experimentation," NBER Working Papers 17602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Isabelle Brocas & Juan Carrillo, 2004. "Commitment devices under self-control problems: an overview," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9665, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Hongbin Cai, 2009. "Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 173-189.
- L. J. Bourgeois, III & Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, 1988. "Strategic Decision Processes in High Velocity Environments: Four Cases in the Microcomputer Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(7), pages 816-835, July.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113046, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Altmann, Steffen & Traxler, Christian & Weinschenk, Philipp, 2017. "Deadlines and Cognitive Limitations," IZA Discussion Papers 11129, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2014. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-533, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Sofia Moroni, 2016. "Experimentation in Organizations," Working Paper 5876, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Marc Möller, 2016. "Team Adaptation," CEP Discussion Papers dp1421, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas, 2016. "Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 145-169.
- Bonatti, Alessandro & Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "The Politics of Compromise," CEPR Discussion Papers 9910, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "A Tenure-Clock Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0919, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2017. "Dynamic Performance Evaluation with Deadlines: The Role of Commitment," ISER Discussion Paper 1015, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
- O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2016-05-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HRM-2016-05-08 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2016-05-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PKE-2016-05-08 (Post Keynesian Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:56861. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (LSERO Manager). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .