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Collaborating

  • Johannes Horner

    (Yale University)

  • Alessandro Bonatti

    (Yale University)

We find that sequential division of labor and deadlines help alleviate the free rider problem. Conversely,indivisibility of tasks, the number of partners, and asymmetries between agents are shown to increase the expected time to completion. The model may be applied to academic co-authorship, as well as to research and development joint ventures.

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File URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2009/paper_1019.pdf
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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 1019.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:1019
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA

Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
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  1. Mason, Robin & Välimäki, Juuso, 2008. "Dynamic Moral Hazard and Project Completion," CEPR Discussion Papers 6857, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Ulrich Hege & Dirk Bergemann, 2005. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," Post-Print hal-00459926, HAL.
  3. Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, . "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6f8dbf67d492ff8a10975496b, Penn Economics Department.
  4. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2004. "Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems," Discussion Papers 1396, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
  7. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2005. "Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(1), pages 131-171.
  8. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
  9. Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
  10. Fershtman, C. & Nitzan, S., 1988. "Dynamic Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods," Papers 21-88, Tel Aviv.
  11. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 259-276.
  12. Ma, Ching-to & Moore, John & Turnbull, Stephen, 1988. "Stopping agents from "cheating"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 355-372, December.
  13. Gradstein, Mark, 1992. "Time Dynamics and Incomplete Information in the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 581-97, June.
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