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Time Dynamics and Incomplete Information in the Private Provision of Public Goods

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  • Gradstein, Mark

Abstract

In this paper, a dynamic model of the provision of a public good with incomplete information is developed. For a finite population, in addition to the standard underprovision type of results, inefficiency occurs because of a delay in contributions. For an infinite population, although delay may disappear, underprovision remains so that equilibrium is still inefficient. Policy implications of these results are described, emphasis being put on possible government intervention with incomplete information. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Gradstein, Mark, 1992. "Time Dynamics and Incomplete Information in the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 581-597, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:100:y:1992:i:3:p:581-97
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    2. Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner, 2011. "Collaborating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 632-663, April.
    3. Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2004. "Delay in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1169-1178, October.
    4. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2008. "An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 67-76, January.
    5. Pavel Diev & Walid Hichri, 2008. "Dynamic voluntary contributions to a discrete public good: Experimental evidence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(23), pages 1-11.
    6. repec:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:1:p:9:n:10 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On the provision of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 111-130, April.
    8. Wallace HUFFMAN & Richard E. JUST, 1995. "Transaction Costs, Fads, And Politically Motivated Misdirection In Agricultural Research," Staff Papers 277, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
    9. Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, 2000. "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 327-358.
    10. Christiane Clemens & Thomas Riechmann, 2006. "Evolutionary Dynamics in Public Good Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 399-420, November.
    11. Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2011. "On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 119-145, February.
    12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:23:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. May Elsayyad & Florian Morath, 2016. "Technology Transfers For Climate Change," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57, pages 1057-1084, August.
    14. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2007. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 425-449, June.
    15. DUDLEY, Leonard & WITT, Ulrich, 2003. "Yesterday’s Games: Contingency Learning and the Growth of Public Spending, 1890-1938," Cahiers de recherche 2003-20, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    16. Hayes, Kathy J & Razzolini, Laura & Ross, Leola B, 1998. "Bureaucratic Choice and Nonoptimal Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 1-20, January.
    17. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K. & Temimi, Akram, 2001. "Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 493-514, July.
    18. Gradstein, Mark, 1998. "Provision of public goods in a large economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 229-234, November.
    19. Harstad, Bård, 2016. "The market for conservation and other hostages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 124-151.
    20. Kessing, Sebastian Georg, 2003. "Delay in joint projects
      [Verzögerung bei gemeinsamen Projekten]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-15, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    21. Magee, Stephen & Lee, Hak Loh & Lee, Hongshik, 2017. "Simple measures of endogenous free-riding in protectionist lobbies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 324-333.
    22. Park In-Uck, 2004. "A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-26, June.
    23. Shlomit Hon-Snir & Benyamin Shitovitz & Menahem Spiegel, 2010. "Bayesian Equilibrium in a Public Good Economy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 387-398, April.
    24. Hichri, Pavel & Hichri, Walid, 2008. "An auction mechanism for public goods provision: an experimental study," MPRA Paper 7884, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2008.

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