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Repeated Charitable Contributions under Incomplete Information

Author

Listed:
  • ParimalKanti Bag
  • Santanu Roy

Abstract

Incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of charities by potential donors provides an important strategic rationale for announcement of donations during fundraising drives and explains why donors may add to their initial contributions after learning about contributions made by others. In a two-stage fundraising drive where potential donors may contribute at either or both stages, it is shown that under certain conditions, announcement of contributions generates higher expected total contribution. Contribution announcement plays a similar positive role even when the charity acquires information about donor valuations prior to actual fundraising and can take actions to mitigate incomplete information among donors. Copyright 2008 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2008.

Suggested Citation

  • ParimalKanti Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "Repeated Charitable Contributions under Incomplete Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 60-91, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:525:p:60-91
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    Cited by:

    1. Parimal Kanti Bag & Nona Pepito, 2012. "Peer Transparency In Teams: Does It Help Or Hinder Incentives?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1257-1286, November.
    2. Anwesha Banerjee & Nicolas Gravel, 2020. "Contribution to a public good under subjective uncertainty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 473-500, June.
    3. Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2011. "On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 119-145, February.
    4. Luis Mota Freitas & Wilfredo L. Maldonado, 2025. "Quadratic funding with incomplete information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 64(1), pages 43-67, February.
    5. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "A Coordination Game Model of Charitable Giving and Seed Money Effect," ISER Discussion Paper 0736, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    6. Edward Cartwright & Amrish Patel, 2010. "Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 691-708, August.
    7. Matthew Donazzan & Nisvan Erkal & Boon Han Koh, 2016. "Impact of Rebates and Refunds on Contributions to Threshold Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(1), pages 69-86, July.
    8. Anwesha Banerjee & Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad, 2022. "Climate Policy, Irreversibilities and Global Economic Shocks," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2022-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    9. Richard Cornes & Luciana C. Fiorini & Wilfredo L. Maldonado, 2021. "Expectational stability in aggregative games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 235-249, January.
    10. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "A Coordination Game Model of Charitable Giving and Seed Money Effect," ISER Discussion Paper 0736r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, revised Sep 2009.

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