On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
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- Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 0805, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
KeywordsFundraising; Sequential vs. simultaneous contributions; Public goods; Incomplete information; D73; H41; L44;
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
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