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Optimal incentives for sequential production processes


  • Eyal Winter


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  • Eyal Winter, 2006. "Optimal incentives for sequential production processes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 376-390, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:37:y:2006:i:2:p:376-390 DOI: j.1756-2171.2006.tb00021.x

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Charles Zhoucheng Zheng, 2002. "Optimal Auction with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2197-2224, November.
    2. Michael Schwarz & Konstantin Sonin, 2001. "The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1918, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    3. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2000. "Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 768-791, Winter.
    6. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-1499, November.
    7. Haile,P.A., 1999. "Auctions with resale," Working papers 33, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    8. Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-1090, October.
    9. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 597-625.
    10. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1998. "The Optimality of Being Efficient," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpoe, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 18 Jun 1999.
    11. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1996. "Strategic Nonparticipation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 84-98, Spring.
    12. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1999. "Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 971-991.
    13. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    14. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    15. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    16. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
    17. Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January.
    18. Gupta, Madhurima & Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First price auctions with resale," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 181-185, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2016. "Technology, team production and incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 91-94.
    2. López-Pintado, Dunia & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2014. "On discrimination in the optimal management of teams," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 154-162.
    3. Bag, Kanti Parimal & Pepito, Nona, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," ESSEC Working Papers WP1603, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    4. Pol Antràs & Davin Chor, 2013. "Organizing the Global Value Chain," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2127-2204, November.
    5. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 88-91.
    6. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2011. "Double-edged transparency in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 531-542.
    7. Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2011. "On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 119-145, February.
    8. Eyal Winter, 2009. "Incentive Reversal," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 133-147, August.
    9. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    10. Eyal Winter, 2010. "Transparency and incentives among peers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 504-523.
    11. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
    12. Edmans, Alex & Goldstein, Itay & Zhu, John, 2011. "Contracting with Synergies," Working Papers 11-65, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    13. Bel, Roland & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2015. "Team composition, worker effort and welfare," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-8.
    14. Bel, Roland & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2012. "On Broadway and strip malls: how to make a winning team," Working Papers 2012-14, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    15. Kanti Parimal Bag & Nona Pepito, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," Working Papers hal-01282735, HAL.
    16. Dunia López-Pintado & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2011. "On the optimal management of teams under budget constraints," Working Papers 11.11, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    17. Steiger, Eva-Maria & Zultan, Ro'i, 2014. "See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-12.
    18. repec:hrv:faseco:34651704 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Ludwig, Sandra & Strassmair, Christina, 2009. "An Experimental study on the information structure in teams," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 277, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    20. Ester Manna, 2015. "Intrinsically Motivated Agents in Teams," UB Economics Working Papers 2015/326, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB Economics.
    21. Jurjen J. A. Kamphorst & Otto H. Swank, 2016. "Don't Demotivate, Discriminate," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 140-165, February.
    22. Hennessy, David A., 2008. "Biosecurity incentives, network effects, and entry of a rapidly spreading pest," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 230-239, December.
    23. Zhou, Junjie, 2016. "Economics of leadership and hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 88-106.
    24. Eyal Winter & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Jose Mendez-Naya & Luciano Mendez-Naya, 2009. "Mental Equilibrium and Rational Emotions," Discussion Paper Series dp521, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

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