Parimal Bag

Personal Details

First Name:	Parimal
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Bag
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pba495
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Department of Economics
National University of Singapore (NUS)

Singapore, Singapore
http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/

:


RePEc:edi:denussg (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 0805, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
   • Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2011. "On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 119-145, February.

   Cited by:

   1. Ahmet Altiok & Murat Yilmaz, 2014. "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project under Time-Inconsistency," Working Papers 2014/08, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
      • Altınok, Ahmet & Yılmaz, Murat, 2018. "Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project under time inconsistency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 114-140.
   2. Matthew Ellman & Sjaak Hurkens, 2014. "Optimal Crowdfunding Design," Working Papers 14-21, NET Institute.
      • Matthew Ellman & Sjaak Hurkens, 2016. "Optimal Crowdfunding Design," Working Papers 871, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
   3. Giorgio Ferrari & Frank Riedel & Jan-Henrik Steg, 2013. "Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution under Uncertainty: A Stochastic Control Approach," Papers 1307.2849, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2015.
   4. Senatore, L, 2011. "Public Good Provision with Convex Costs," MPRA Paper 36984, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   5. Jack, B. Kelsey & Recalde, María P., 2015. "Leadership and the voluntary provision of public goods: Field evidence from Bolivia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 80-93.
   6. Giuseppe Russo & Luigi Senatore, 2011. "A Note on Contribution Games with Loss Functions," CSEF Working Papers 302, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
      • Russo, Giuseppe & Senatore, Luigi, 2012. "A note on contribution games with loss functions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 211-214.
      • Russo, Giuseppe & Senatore, Luigi, 2011. "A Note on Contribution Games with Loss Functions," MPRA Paper 33423, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   7. Murat Yilmaz, 2010. "Auctioning a Discrete Public Good under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010/14, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
   8. Richárd Kicsiny, 2017. "Solution for a class of closed-loop leader-follower games with convexity conditions on the payoffs," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 253(1), pages 405-429, June.
   9. Miriam Sinn, 2013. "Sequential Group Lending: A Mechanism to Raise the Repayment Rate in Microfinance," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 80(318), pages 326-344, April.
   10. Yifen Mu, 2014. "Inverse Stackelberg Public Goods Game with Multiple Hierarchies Under Global and Local Information Structures," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 332-350, October.
   11. Sikdar, Shiva, 2015. "On efforts in teams with stereotypes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 203-207.
   12. Ferrari, Giorgio & Riedel, Frank & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2014. "Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution under Uncertainty," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 485, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

2. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2005. "Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0205, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
   • Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2006. "Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 478-499, December.

   Cited by:

   1. Dequiedt, V. & Geourjon, A.-M. & Rota-Graziosi, G., 2012. "Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 282-291.
      • Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2012. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," Post-Print halshs-00726067, HAL.
      • Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," Working Papers halshs-00554316, HAL.
      • Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Vianney DEQUIEDT, 2009. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," Working Papers 200910, CERDI.
      • V. Dequiedt & A.-M. Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2012. "Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs," Post-Print hal-01999059, HAL.
   2. Burlando, Alfredo & Motta, Alberto, 2016. "Legalize, tax, and deter: Optimal enforcement policies for corruptible officials," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 207-215.
   3. Salvatore Capasso & Rajeev K. Goel & James W. Saunoris, 2019. "Is it the gums, teeth or the bite? Effectiveness of dimensions of enforcement in curbing corruption," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 329-369, December.
      • Salvatore Capasso & Rajeev K. Goel & James W. Saunoris, 2018. "Is it the Gums, Teeth or the Bite? Effectiveness of Dimensions of Enforcement in Curbing Corruption," CESifo Working Paper Series 7316, CESifo Group Munich.
   4. Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.

3. Bag, P.K. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0418, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
   • Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid, 2005. "Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 43-58, October.
   • Parimal Kanti Bag; Hamid Sabourian, 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 257, Econometric Society.

   Cited by:

   1. Georgy Artemov, 2006. "Imminent Nash Implementation as a Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(14), pages 1-8.
   2. Parimal Kanti Bag; Hamid Sabourian, 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 257, Econometric Society.
      • Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid, 2005. "Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 43-58, October.
      • Bag, P.K. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0418, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
   3. Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma," MPRA Paper 8801, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • H. Reiju Mihara, 2012. "The Second-Price Auction Solves King Solomon'S Dilemma," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 420-429, September.
   4. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Chun-Lei Yang, 2009. "Make a guess: a robust mechanism for King Solomon’s dilemma," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 259-268, May.
   5. Brishti Guha, 2017. "Testing for Malice," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(1), pages 327-335.
   6. Guha, Brishti, 2014. "Reinterpreting King Solomon's problem: Malice and mechanism design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 125-132.
   7. Elbittar, Alexander & Di Giannatale, Sonia, 2017. "“Neither I nor you shall have him”: An experimental study of the King Solomon's Dilemma," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 55-69.

4. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Strategic Information Revelation in Fund-Raising Campaigns," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0178, Econometric Society.

   Cited by:

   1. James Andreoni, 2006. "Leadership Giving in Charitable Fund‐Raising," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 1-22, January.
      • Andreoni,J., 2002. "Leadership giving in charitable fund-raising," Working papers 13, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.

5. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society.

   Cited by:

   1. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
      • Motta, Alberto & Burlando, Alfredo, 2007. "Self reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," MPRA Paper 5332, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2007.

6. Parimal Kanti Bag & Emim Murat Dinlersoz & Ruqu Wang, 1998. "More On Phantom Bidding," Working Paper 976, Economics Department, Queen's University.
   • Ruqu Wang & Emin Murat Dinlersoz & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "More on phantom bidding," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(3), pages 701-707.

   Cited by:

   1. Itai Sher, 2012. "Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 341-387, June.
      • Itai Sher, 2008. "Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism," Working Papers 2008-4, University of Minnesota, Department of Economics, revised 05 2009.
   2. Georgia Kosmopoulou & Dakshina G. De Silva, 2005. "The Effect of Shill Bidding upon Prices: Experimental Evidence," Experimental 0512002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Kosmopoulou, Georgia & De Silva, Dakshina G., 2007. "The effect of shill bidding upon prices: Experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 291-313, April.
   3. Coatney, Kalyn & Harri, Ardian, 2015. "Auctioneer Versus a Dominant Bidder: Evidence from a Cattle Auction," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 207368, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
   4. Takahiro Watanabe & Takehiko Yamato, 2008. "A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(1), pages 57-80, July.
   5. Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
   6. Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
   7. Gustavo Rodriguez, 2012. "Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(1), pages 143-173, January.
   8. Herzog, Dominic, 2014. "Shill Bidder’s Behavior in a Second-Price Online Auction," Working papers 2014/03, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.

Articles

1. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Mondal, Debasis, 2014. "Group size paradox and public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 215-218.

   Cited by:

   1. Debasis Mondal, 2015. "Private provision of public good and immiserizing growth," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 29-49, June.

2. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Li, Jianpei, 2014. "Bid coordination in split-award procurement: The buyer need not know anything," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 143-146.

   Cited by:

   1. Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2016. "Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization," Discussion Papers 2016-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
   2. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2019. "Dual sourcing with price discovery," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 225-246.
      • Alcalde, Jose & Dahm, Mathias, 2016. "Dual Sourcing with Price Discovery," QM&ET Working Papers 16-1, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.

3. Murali Agastya & Parimal Kanti Bag & Indranil Chakraborty, 2014. "Communication and authority with a partially informed expert," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 176-197, March.

   Cited by:

   1. Murali Agastya & Parimal Kanti Bag & Indranil Chakraborty, 2015. "Proximate preferences and almost full revelation in the Crawford–Sobel game," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 201-212, October.
   2. Kim, Doyoung, 2017. "Reputation Concerns And Authority In Organizations," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 58(2), pages 89-106, December.
   3. Schottmuller, C., 2011. "Cost Incentives for Doctors : A Double-Edged Sword," Discussion Paper 2011-105, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Schottmüller, Christoph, 2013. "Cost incentives for doctors: A double-edged sword," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 43-58.
   4. Aurora García-Gallego & Penélope Hernández-Rojas & Amalia Rodrigo-González, 2019. "Efficient coordination in the lab," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 14(1), pages 175-201, March.
   5. Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Randolph Sloof, 2016. "Communication versus (Restricted) Delegation: An Experimental Comparison," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-050/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
   6. Katayama, Hajime & Meagher, Kieron J. & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Authority and communication in firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 315-348.

4. Parimal Kanti Bag & Nona Pepito, 2012. "Peer Transparency In Teams: Does It Help Or Hinder Incentives?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1257-1286, November.

   Cited by:

   1. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 88-91.
   2. Bag, Kanti Parimal & Pepito, Nona, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," ESSEC Working Papers WP1603, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
   3. Zhou, Junjie, 2016. "Economics of leadership and hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 88-106.
   4. Alex Gershkov & Eyal Winter, 2015. "Formal versus Informal Monitoring in Teams," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 27-44, May.
   5. Kanti Parimal Bag & Nona Pepito, 2016. "Harmful transparency in teams," Working Papers hal-01282735, HAL.
   6. Sonntag, Axel & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2019. "Personal accountability and cooperation in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 428-448.

5. Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2011. "On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 119-145, February.
   • Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 0805, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
   See citations under working paper version above.
6. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2011. "Double-edged transparency in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 531-542, August.

   Cited by:

   1. Khadjavi, Menusch & Lange, Andreas & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2014. "The Social Value of Transparency and Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Asymmetric Public Good Games," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100512, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   2. Meagher, Kieron & Prasad, Suraj, 2016. "Career concerns and team talent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 1-17.
   3. Steiger, Eva-Maria & Zultan, Ro'i, 2014. "See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-12.
   4. Eva-Maria Steiger & Ro'i Zultan, 2011. "See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-040, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
      • Roi Zultan & Eva-Maria Steiger, 2011. "See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams," Working Papers 1108, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
   5. Susumu Cato & Akifumi Ishihara, 2017. "Transparency and Performance Evaluation in Sequential Agency," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(3), pages 475-506.

7. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Saha, Bibhas, 2011. "Match-fixing under competitive odds," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 318-344.

   Cited by:

   1. Alasdair Brown & Fuyu Yang, 2014. "Have Betting Exchanges Corrupted Horse Racing?," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 066, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
   2. Helmut Dietl & Christian Weingärtner, 2012. "Betting scandals and attenuated property rights - How betting related match fixing can be prevented in future," Working Papers 0154, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
   3. Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2016. "On the effect of taxation in the online sports betting market," MPRA Paper 72596, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Juan Vidal-Puga, 2017. "On the effect of taxation in the online sports betting market," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 145-175, June.

8. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.

   Cited by:

   1. Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "Heuristic Voting Under the Alternative Vote: The Efficiency of “Sour Grapes” Behavior," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 57-76, August.
      • Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of `sour grapes’ behavior," Post-Print halshs-01518280, HAL.
   2. Pablo Amorós & M. Socorro Puy & Ricardo Martínez, 2016. "Closed primaries versus top-two primaries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 21-35, April.
   3. Dekel, Eddie & Piccione, Michele, 2014. "The strategic dis/advantage of voting early," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61288, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
      • Eddie Dekel Jr. & Michele Piccione Jr., 2014. "The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 162-179, November.
      • Dekel, Eddie & Piccione, Michele, 2012. "The Strategic Disadvantage of Voting Early," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275769, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
   4. Pablo Amorós & Ricardo Martínez & Bernardo Moreno & M. Socorro Puy, 2010. "Deciding Whether a Law is Constitutional, Interpretable, or Unconstitutional," Working Papers 2010-09, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
      • Pablo Amorós & Ricardo Martínez & Bernardo Moreno & M. Puy, 2012. "Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 1-14, March.
   5. Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of “sour grapes" behavior," Working Papers halshs-01168670, HAL.
   6. Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A. & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2014. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 91-99.
      • Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Ángel Ballester & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2012. "A Foundation for Strategic Agenda Voting," Working Papers 607, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
      • Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Ballester & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2012. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Economics Working Papers 1302, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
   7. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Statistical utilitarianism," MPRA Paper 49561, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Marcus Pivato, 2014. "Statistical utilitarianism," THEMA Working Papers 2014-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
   8. Marcus Pivato, 2014. "Condorcet Meets Bentham," THEMA Working Papers 2014-17, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
      • Pivato, Marcus, 2015. "Condorcet meets Bentham," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 58-65.
   9. Puy, M. Socorro & Martínez, Ricardo & Amorós, P., 2013. "The closed primaries versus the top-two primary," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1319, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
      • Pablo Amorós & M. Socorro Puy & Ricardo Martínez, 2014. "The Closed Primaries versus the Top-two Primary," Working Papers 2014-02, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
   10. Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," IDEI Working Papers 559, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
       • Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," TSE Working Papers 09-065, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
       • Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
   11. Healy, Paul J. & Peress, Michael, 2015. "Preference domains and the monotonicity of condorcet extensions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 21-23.
   12. Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of “sour grapes" behavior," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01168670, HAL.
   13. Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of “sour grapes" behavior," PSE Working Papers halshs-01168670, HAL.
   14. Matias Nunez & Gabriel Desranges & Mathieu Martin, 2014. "Multi-Stage Voting and Sequential Elimination with Productive Players," THEMA Working Papers 2014-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

9. ParimalKanti Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "Repeated Charitable Contributions under Incomplete Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 60-91, January.

   Cited by:

   1. Edward Cartwright & Amrish Patel, 2010. "Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 691-708, August.
   2. Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2011. "On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 119-145, February.
      • Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 0805, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.

10. Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2006. "Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 478-499, December.
    • Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2005. "Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0205, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    See citations under working paper version above.
11. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid, 2005. "Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 43-58, October.
    • Parimal Kanti Bag; Hamid Sabourian, 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 257, Econometric Society.
    • Bag, P.K. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0418, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    See citations under working paper version above.
12. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2003. "All-or-nothing verdict as a screening device," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(3), pages 536-559, July.

    Cited by:

    1. McCannon, Bryan C., 2010. "Homicide trials in Classical Athens," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 46-51, March.

13. Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2003. "Strategic information revelation in fundraising," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 659-679, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Potters, J.J.M. & Sefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2003. "After You - Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games," Discussion Paper 2003-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
       • Potters, J.J.M. & Sefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2005. "After you - endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games," Other publications TiSEM db491f52-df7b-43dd-ab2b-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
       • Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin & Vesterlund, Lise, 2005. "After you--endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1399-1419, August.
    2. Agranov, Marina & Schotter, Andrew, 2013. "Language and government coordination: An experimental study of communication in the announcement game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 26-39.

14. Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2001. "Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 722-748, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September.
    2. Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.

15. Ruqu Wang & Emin Murat Dinlersoz & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "More on phantom bidding," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(3), pages 701-707.
    • Parimal Kanti Bag & Emim Murat Dinlersoz & Ruqu Wang, 1998. "More On Phantom Bidding," Working Paper 976, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    See citations under working paper version above.
16. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Winter, Eyal, 1999. "Simple Subscription Mechanisms for Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 72-94, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu & Na, Sunghyun, 2001. "Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 415-429, December.
    2. Barbieri Stefano & Malueg David A., 2010. "Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, February.
    3. Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicolò, 2007. "Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 714.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
       • Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio, 2008. "Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 591-611, November.
    4. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2013. "Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 77-89.
    5. Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 242-264, October.
       • Suresh Mutuswami & Eyal Winter, 2001. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Discussion Paper Series dp264, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
       • MUTUSWAMI, Suresh & WINTER, Eyal, 2000. "Subscription mechanisms for network formation," CORE Discussion Papers 2000020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Mutuswami, Suresh & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2004. "Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 111-123, July.
    7. Suresh Mutuswami & Eyal Winter, 2002. "Efficient Mechanisms for Multiple Public Goods," Discussion Paper Series dp314, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
       • Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2004. "Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 629-644, March.
    8. Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2008. "Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 190(3), pages 659-671, November.
    9. Breitmoser, Yves, 2011. "Binomial menu auctions in government formation," MPRA Paper 28576, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2015. "A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley–Shubik rule," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 111-118.
    11. Suresh Mutuswami & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 479.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    12. Masaki Aoyagi, 2010. "Monopoly Sale of a Network Good," ISER Discussion Paper 0794, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    13. Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2013. "A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley rule," MPRA Paper 43790, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Strategic Information Revelation in Fund-Raising Campaigns," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0178, Econometric Society.

17. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Public Goods Provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin Mechanism for Restricted Agent Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 460-472, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2018. "Sharing sequential values in a network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 734-779.
       • Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2016. "Sharing Sequential Values in a Network," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 3-2017, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    2. Reischmann, Andreas, 2016. "Conditional Contribution Mechanisms for the Provision of Public Goods in Dynamic Settings - Theory and Experimental Evidence," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145613, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Mealem, Yosef, 2011. "Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 165-167, August.
    4. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
    5. Mealem, Yosef, 2010. "Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 194-197, May.

18. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 322-344, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Preemptive Bribery with Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 13/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    2. Pi, Jiancai & Zhou, Yu, 2013. "Institutional quality and skilled–unskilled wage inequality," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 356-363.
    3. Amal Sanyal, 2000. "Bribes for Faster Delivery," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 474.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Kahana, Nava & Qijun, Liu, 2010. "Endemic corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 82-88, March.
    5. Mishra, Ajit, 2002. "Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 165-178, February.
       • Ajit Mishra, 2000. "Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In A Model Of Enforcement," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 112, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
       • A Mishra, "undated". "Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In Model Of Enforcement," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 067, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
       • Ajit Mishra, 1996. "Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In A Model Of Enforcement," Working papers 34, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    6. Andrew Samuel & Aaron Lowen, 2010. "Bribery and inspection technology," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 333-350, November.
    7. Carolyn M. Warner, 2002. "Creating a Common Market for Fraud and Corruption in the European Union: an Institutional Accident, or a Deliberate Strategy?," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 31, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    8. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society.
    9. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats : Une revue de la littérature microéconomique," Working Papers 2005-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    10. Mandal, Biswajit & Marjit, Sugata, 2010. "Corruption and wage inequality?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 166-172, January.

19. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Optimal auction design and R&D," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 1655-1674, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Jingfeng Lu, 2010. "Entry Coordination And Auction Design With Private Costs Of Information Acquisition," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 274-289, April.
    2. Rosar, Frank & Mueller, Florian, 2014. "Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100599, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Bargaining with Rent Seekers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 859-871, October.
    4. Asseyer, Andreas, 2018. "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 222-252.
    5. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2000. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1784, Econometric Society.
       • Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June.
    6. Rosar, Frank & Mueller, Florian, 2015. "Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 259-280.
    7. Andreas Asseyer, 2015. "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," Working Papers 2015002, Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS).
    8. Yeon-Koo Che & Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey, 2015. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEIS Research Paper 358, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 22 Oct 2015.
       • Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick, 2016. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," TSE Working Papers 16-695, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2017.
       • Che, Yeon-Koo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick, 2017. "Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 120, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    10. Kentaro Tomoeda, 2018. "Efficient Investments in the Implementation Problem," Working Paper Series 54, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
        • Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2019. "Efficient investments in the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 247-278.
    11. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862.
    12. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Zhang, Heng & Yang, Ming & Bao, Jiye & Gong, Pu, 2013. "Competitive investing equilibrium under a procurement mechanism," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 734-738.

20. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1996. "Efficient Allocation of a "Pie": Divisible Case of King Solomon's Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 21-41, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Parimal Kanti Bag; Hamid Sabourian, 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 257, Econometric Society.
       • Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid, 2005. "Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 43-58, October.
       • Bag, P.K. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0418, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Elbittar, Alexander & Di Giannatale, Sonia, 2017. "“Neither I nor you shall have him”: An experimental study of the King Solomon's Dilemma," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 55-69.

21. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Dasgupta, Sudipto, 1995. "Strategic R&D success announcements," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 17-26, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2011. "Double-edged transparency in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 531-542.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (2) 2006-01-24 2006-01-24
2. NEP-SEA: South East Asia (2) 2008-08-14 2010-07-17
3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2007-10-27
4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2008-08-14
5. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2008-08-14
6. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2007-10-27
7. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2004-03-14
8. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 2008-08-14
9. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2006-01-24
10. NEP-SPO: Sports & Economics (1) 2010-07-17
11. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (1) 2008-08-14

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