Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem
We consider a multi-award generalisation of King Solomon’s problem: k identical and indivisible awards should be distributed among agents, k 1) prizes efficiently in sub-game perfect equilibria without any monetary transfers in equilibrium. Finally, in the multi-awards case we relax the complete information assumption and achieve implementation of efficient allocation by iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, using generalisation of Olszewski’s (2003) mechanism.
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- Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1996. "Efficient Allocation of a "Pie": Divisible Case of King Solomon's Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 21-41, January.
- Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J., 1999.
"A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-285, January.
- Olszewski, Wojciech, 2003. "A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 315-318, February.
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