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Reinterpreting King Solomon's problem: Malice and mechanism design

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  • Guha, Brishti

Abstract

I argue for an alternative interpretation of King Solomon's problem in terms of one of the two claimants being “malicious”. A “malicious” claimant places no intrinsic value on the object but derives utility from depriving the rival claimant. This new interpretation permits a simpler solution than those considered in the literature; I derive a mechanism that induces truthful revelation where the equilibrium involves a single round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and no monetary transfers. I consider extensions which allow for the malicious claimant to also place some low but positive intrinsic valuation on the object; I also discuss the possibility of two-sided malice, and provide examples of several real-life contexts to which the mechanism or its extensions are applicable.

Suggested Citation

  • Guha, Brishti, 2014. "Reinterpreting King Solomon's problem: Malice and mechanism design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 125-132.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:98:y:2014:i:c:p:125-132
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gans, Joshua S. & Holden, Richard, 2025. "An ordinal solution to King Solomon’s dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 252(C).
    2. Guha, Brishti, 2019. "Malice and patience in Rubinstein bargaining," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 264-270.
    3. Brishti Guha, 2018. "Malice in auctions and commitments to cancel," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(3), pages 1623-1631.
    4. Guha, Brishti, 2018. "Malice in the Rubinstein bargaining game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 82-86.
    5. Guha, Brishti, 2016. "Malicious litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 24-32.
    6. Brishti Guha, 2017. "Testing for Malice," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(1), pages 327-335.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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