Public Good Provision with Convex Costs
This paper considers a model of voluntary public good provision with two players and convex costs. I demonstrate that the provision of public good is higher in the sequential framework under fairly general conditions. This outcome shows that introducing convex costs may reverse under some condition the results of Varian ( 1994).
|Date of creation:||Dec 2011|
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"Who Contributes? A Strategic Approach to a European Immigration Policy,"
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