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How To Safeguard World Heritage Sites? A Theoretical Model of "Cultural Responsibility"

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Abstract

We outline a model in which preservation of UNESCO heritage sites is analyzed as a classical global public good problem where the decentralized Nash equilibrium yields suboptimal contribution vis-à-vis the Social Planner equilibrium. The absence of a Global Social Planner and the need of coordination across different countries for the implementation of the second solution make the Social Planner equilibrium hardly attainable. The same problem arises when trying to enforce symmetric or asymmetric tax deductions in different countries. We analyse the contribution that cultural corporate responsibility can give to the solution of the problem discussing its limits and potential vis-à-vis the other two alternatives.

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  • Leonardo Becchetti & Nazaria Solferino & Maria Elisabetta Tessitore, 2014. "How To Safeguard World Heritage Sites? A Theoretical Model of "Cultural Responsibility"," CEIS Research Paper 318, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 18 Jul 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:318
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Goods; Firm Behavior; Cultural Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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