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How to safeguard world heritage sites? A theoretical model of “cultural responsibility”

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  • Leonardo Becchetti
  • Nazaria Solferino
  • M. Tessitore

Abstract

We outline a model in which preservation of UNESCO heritage sites is analyzed as a classical global public good problem where the decentralized Nash equilibrium yields suboptimal contribution vis-à-vis the Social Planner equilibrium. The absence of a Global Social Planner and the need of coordination across different countries for the implementation of the second solution make the Social Planner equilibrium hardly attainable. The same problem arises when trying to enforce symmetric or asymmetric tax deductions in different countries. We analyze the contribution that cultural corporate responsibility can give to the solution of the problem discussing its limits and potential vis-à-vis the other two alternatives. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

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  • Leonardo Becchetti & Nazaria Solferino & M. Tessitore, 2015. "How to safeguard world heritage sites? A theoretical model of “cultural responsibility”," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 62(3), pages 223-248, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:62:y:2015:i:3:p:223-248
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-015-0237-9
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Firm behavior; Cultural economics; H41; D21; Z1;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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