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On the political determinants of the allocation of funds to heritage authorities

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  • Guccio, Calogero
  • Mazza, Isidoro

Abstract

We study the distribution of funds in Sicily (the Autonomous Sicilian Region) to the heritage authorities of regional governments. Using data uniquely available for the nine provinces of Sicily for the period of 1992–2002, we find that the allocation of funding for cultural heritage conservation activities was politically motivated and influenced by the prominence of representatives of the ruling coalition in a district and the loyalty of voters to the main party.

Suggested Citation

  • Guccio, Calogero & Mazza, Isidoro, 2014. "On the political determinants of the allocation of funds to heritage authorities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 18-38.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:18-38
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.12.004
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    3. Bertacchini, Enrico & Dalle Nogare, Chiara, 2014. "Public provision vs. outsourcing of cultural services: Evidence from Italian cities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 168-182.
    4. Tarık ILIMAN & Recep TEKELİ, 2016. "Political Economy of Poverty in Turkey," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 24(29).
    5. Castiglione, Concetta & Infante, Davide & Zieba, Marta, 2023. "Public support for performing arts. Efficiency and productivity gains in eleven European countries," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    6. Jiangang Shi & Xinru Min & Hongyun Si & Daizhong Tang & Wei Miao, 2019. "The Transition from Housing Demolition to Conservation and Renovation in Shanghai: Challenges and Countermeasures," Land, MDPI, vol. 8(11), pages 1-18, November.
    7. Leonardo Becchetti & Nazaria Solferino & M. Tessitore, 2015. "How to safeguard world heritage sites? A theoretical model of “cultural responsibility”," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 62(3), pages 223-248, September.
    8. Manfred J. Holler & Isidoro Mazza, 2013. "Cultural heritage: public decision-making and implementation," Chapters, in: Ilde Rizzo & Anna Mignosa (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Cultural Heritage, chapter 2, pages i-i, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Cuccia, Tiziana & Monaco, Luisa & Rizzo, Ilde, 2015. "Are less public funds bad? New strategies for cultural operators," MPRA Paper 64782, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Heritage conservation; Political allocation; Fiscal federalism; Electoral competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy

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