Formula Funding of Public Services: An Economic Analysis
This paper discusses the economic implications of distributing funds for devolved public services using mechanical formulae. The rationale for using such methods is that they will contribute to the increased efficiency and equity of public services. By acting as arbiters in complex bargaining situations, they also serve important political objectives. The principles of formula funding are examined from an economic perspective, using a production-function approach. As well as yielding major benefits, formula funding has the potential for introducing perverse incentives and risk-avoidance behaviour, particularly among smaller units such as schools and general practices. Strategies for avoiding adverse outcomes are discussed, and the broader political context within which formula funding operates is examined. The paper ends with an assessment of the priorities for future developments in formula funding. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:301-322. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.