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The political economy of cultural spending: evidence from Italian cities

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  • Chiara Dalle Nogare

  • Matteo Galizzi

Abstract

Political Economy and the Economics of Art and Cultural Heritage rarely have intersected. In this paper we investigate the relationship between Italian municipalities’ spending on culture in the 90s and 2000s and a number of political variables, such as a left/right dummy, an election year dummy and a term limit indicator, controlling, among others, for economic as well as socio-demographic characteristics of their population, level of human capital and instruction, proxies of social capital, extent of private financing of cultural provision, touristic and artistic relevance. We use panel data regression analysis and find that there are indeed some significant political determinants of local government cultural expenditure.
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Suggested Citation

  • Chiara Dalle Nogare & Matteo Galizzi, 2011. "The political economy of cultural spending: evidence from Italian cities," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 35(3), pages 203-231, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:35:y:2011:i:3:p:203-231
    DOI: 10.1007/s10824-011-9145-3
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature

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