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Public provision vs. outsourcing of cultural services: Evidence from Italian cities

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  • Bertacchini, Enrico
  • Dalle Nogare, Chiara

Abstract

Cultural policy often implies the transfer of public resources to cultural institutions. In this contribution we focus on the determinants of a government's choice between subsidies to external cultural organizations and in-house cultural production. We argue that the determinants of grants in the cultural field may be the same as those of outsourced services, and we make reference to the empirical literature on the drivers of public services outsourcing. We consider Italian cities' cultural policies in the 1998–2008 period, a time when overall cultural expenditure shrank while cultural transfers increased. Using dynamic panel data analysis and controlling for specific economic, fiscal, and political characteristics of each city, we find that transfers to cultural organizations are negatively affected by asset specificity and more likely to occur in cities subject to fiscal stress. The results also highlight that the timing of elections plays a role.

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  • Bertacchini, Enrico & Dalle Nogare, Chiara, 2014. "Public provision vs. outsourcing of cultural services: Evidence from Italian cities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 168-182.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:35:y:2014:i:c:p:168-182
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.06.004
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    3. Michael Getzner, 2022. "Socio-economic and spatial determinants of municipal cultural spending," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 46(4), pages 699-722, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public cultural expenditure; Local government; Outsourcing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature

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