Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods
We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good. The Stackelberg leader is willing to accept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-cooperative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threat point of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg leader will refuse to accept the transfer if she can.
Volume (Year): 3 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: 30 June 1995 / Accepted: 18 February 1997|
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