Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining
This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that, for the spouse who takes the second decision, a greater discount factor increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good.
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