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Les modèles non unitaires de comportement du ménage : un survol de la littérature

  • Chiappori, Pierre-André

    (Columbia University)

  • Donni, Olivier

    (Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

This paper examines the literature on non-unitary models of household behaviour. These models explicitly postulate that the household is made up of several persons with different preferences. They can be classified into two categories. On the one hand, cooperative (or collective) models suppose that the outcome of the decision process is Pareto efficient. On the other hand, non-cooperative (or strategic) models are based on the concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium and, in that case, the outcome of the decision process is not necessarily efficient. Demand functions or labour supply functions derived from non-unitary models have to satisfy some restrictions that are different from Slutsky conditions. Moreover, in some circumstances, preferences of household members can be identified from observable behaviour. Cet article s’intéresse aux modèles non unitaires de comportement du ménage. Ces modèles supposent explicitement que le ménage est composé de plusieurs personnes ayant des préférences distinctes. Ils se classent alors en deux catégories principales : d’une part, les modèles coopératifs (ou collectifs), dans lesquels les allocations sont supposées efficaces au sens de Pareto, et d’autre part, les modèles non coopératifs (ou stratégiques) qui s’appuient sur la notion d’équilibre de Cournot-Nash. Dans ces modèles, les fonctions qui caractérisent le comportement du ménage doivent satisfaire des contraintes différentes des traditionnelles conditions de Slutsky. De plus, dans certains cas particuliers, les préférences des membres du ménage peuvent être identifiées à partir du comportement observable.

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Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 82 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (mars-juin)
Pages: 9-52

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:82:y:2006:i:1:p:9-52
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