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Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage

Author

Listed:
  • Shelly Lundberg
  • Robert A. Pollak

Abstract

The standard economic model of the family is a 'common preference' model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources. In recent years, this model has been challenged by game-theoretic models of marriage that do not impose 'pooling' and are, therefore, consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior. In this paper, the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence, and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage.

Suggested Citation

  • Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:10:y:1996:i:4:p:139-58
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.4.139
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.10.4.139
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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