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Non-Market Valuation and the Household

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  • Smith, V. Kerry
  • Van Houtven, George

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to describe the implications of the collective model of household behavior for the methods used to estimate the economic value of non-marketed environmental resources. The effects of public good and risk are considered, along with revealed and stated preference methods. To the extent the collective framework is adopted, then recover of individual preferences from household behavior requires distinguishing how preference and within household income allocations affect choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Smith, V. Kerry & Van Houtven, George, 1998. "Non-Market Valuation and the Household," Working Papers 98-04, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:duk:dukeec:98-04
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard T. Carson, 2011. "Contingent Valuation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2489.
    2. Annarita Colasante & Aurora García-Gallego & Andrea Morone & Tiziana Temerario, 2017. "The utopia of cooperation: does intra-group competition drive out free riding?," Working Papers 2017/08, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    3. Nesha Beharry-Borg & David Hensher & Riccardo Scarpa, 2009. "An Analytical Framework for Joint vs Separate Decisions by Couples in Choice Experiments: The Case of Coastal Water Quality in Tobago," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 43(1), pages 95-117, May.
    4. Henrik Lindhjem & Ståle Navrud, 2009. "Asking for Individual or Household Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 43(1), pages 11-29, May.
    5. Martina Menon & Federico Perali & Marcella Veronesi, 2014. "Recovering Individual Preferences for Non-Market Goods: A Collective Travel-Cost Model," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 96(2), pages 438-457.
    6. Mushtaq Ahmed Memon & Shunji Matsuoka, 2002. "Validity of contingent valuation estimates from developing countries: scope sensitivity analysis," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 5(1), pages 39-61, March.
    7. Jim Neumann & Harriet Greenwood, 2002. "Existing Literature and Recommended Strategies for Valuation of Children's Health Effects," NCEE Working Paper Series 200207, National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, revised Sep 2002.
    8. Donna Dosman & Wiktor Adamowicz, 2006. "Combining Stated and Revealed Preference Data to Construct an Empirical Examination of Intrahousehold Bargaining," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 15-34, March.
    9. Mushtaq Memon & Shunji Matsuoka, 2002. "Validity of contingent valuation estimates from developing countries: scope sensitivity analysis," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 5(1), pages 39-61, March.
    10. Smith, V. Kerry, 2000. "JEEM and Non-market Valuation: 1974-1998," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 351-374, May.
    11. Liam Delaney & Francis O’Toole, 2006. "Willingness to pay: individual or household?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 30(4), pages 305-309, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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