IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/ualbsp/24084.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Combining Stated And Revealed Preference Data To Construct An Empirical Examination Of Intrahousehold Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Dosman, Donna
  • Adamowicz, Wiktor L.

Abstract

The behavior of households has traditionally been explained by assuming that a single decision maker maximizes utility over all members of the household subject to a budget constraint. This unitary model of household behavior has been questioned and compared to models that assume that household decisions are made in a bargaining process. We examine household behavior in a bargaining framework by combining stated preference information from individual members of the household with revealed preference information on the household's actual choices. The context of the decision is determining the location of family recreation vacation choice. The resulting model, based on a bargaining framework, provides information on the factors affecting bargaining power as well as information on the degree to which the decision is the result of a bargaining process.

Suggested Citation

  • Dosman, Donna & Adamowicz, Wiktor L., 2002. "Combining Stated And Revealed Preference Data To Construct An Empirical Examination Of Intrahousehold Bargaining," Staff Paper Series 24084, University of Alberta, Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ualbsp:24084
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.24084
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/24084/files/sp020001.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.24084?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lance Lochner, 2007. "Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 444-460, March.
    2. Joel Huber and Kenneth Train., 2000. "On the Similarity of Classical and Bayesian Estimates of Individual Mean Partworths," Economics Working Papers E00-289, University of California at Berkeley.
    3. Hanemann, W. Michael, 1982. "Applied Welfare Analysis with Qualitative Response Models," CUDARE Working Papers 7160, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    4. Train,Kenneth E., 2009. "Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521766555, January.
    5. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
    6. Duncan Thomas, 1990. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 635-664.
    7. Frederic Vermeulen, 2002. "Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 533-564, September.
    8. Filiatrault, Pierre & Ritchie, J R Brent, 1980. "Joint Purchasing Decisions: A Comparison of Influence Structure in Family and Couple Decision-Making Units," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 7(2), pages 131-140, Se.
    9. Adeline Delavande, 2008. "Pill, Patch, Or Shot? Subjective Expectations And Birth Control Choice," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(3), pages 999-1042, August.
    10. Kai A. Konrad & Kjell Erik Lommerud, 2000. "The bargaining family revisited," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(2), pages 471-487, May.
    11. Shelley A. Phipps & Peter S. Burton, 1998. "What’s Mine is Yours? The Influence of Male and Female Incomes on Patterns of Household Expenditure," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(260), pages 599-613, November.
    12. Pahl, Jan, 1995. "His money, her money: Recent research on financial organisation in marriage," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 361-376, September.
    13. Anders Karlstrom, 2003. "A Simple Method of Incorporating Income Effects into Logit and Nested-Logit Models: Theory and Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 85(1), pages 248-253.
    14. Charles F. Manski, 2000. "Economic Analysis of Social Interactions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 115-136, Summer.
    15. Michael D. Hurd & James P. Smith & Julie M. Zissimopoulos, 2004. "The effects of subjective survival on retirement and Social Security claiming," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(6), pages 761-775.
    16. Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Working Papers 94-6, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    17. Louviere,Jordan J. & Hensher,David A. & Swait,Joffre D. With contributions by-Name:Adamowicz,Wiktor, 2000. "Stated Choice Methods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521788304.
    18. Vermeulen, Frederic, 2002. "Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 533-564, September.
    19. Smith, V. Kerry & Van Houtven, George, 1998. "Non-Market Valuation and the Household," Working Papers 98-04, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    20. Elizabeth Katz, 1997. "The Intra-Household Economics of Voice and Exit," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 25-46.
    21. Michael Bittman & Paula England & Nancy Folbre & George Matheson, 2001. "When Gender Trumps Money: Bargaining and Time in Household Work," JCPR Working Papers 221, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
    22. T. Paul Schultz, 1990. "Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and Fertility," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 599-634.
    23. Adamowicz W. & Louviere J. & Williams M., 1994. "Combining Revealed and Stated Preference Methods for Valuing Environmental Amenities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 271-292, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2009. "Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 4603, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Xu, Zeyu, 2007. "A survey on intra-household models and evidence," MPRA Paper 3763, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2006. "Les modèles non unitaires de comportement du ménage : un survol de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 82(1), pages 9-52, mars-juin.
    5. Rong, Rong & Gnagey, Matthew & Grijalva, Therese, 2018. "“The less you Discount, the more it shows you really care”: Interpersonal discounting in households," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 1-23.
    6. Lee, Jungmin, 2004. "Observable and Unobservable Household Sharing Rules: Evidence from Young Couples' Pocket Money," IZA Discussion Papers 1250, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Alberto Alesina & Andrea Ichino & Loukas Karabarbounis, 2011. "Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 1-40, May.
    8. Juarez Laura, 2010. "The Effect of an Old-Age Demogrant on the Labor Supply and Time Use of the Elderly and Non-Elderly in Mexico," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-27, June.
    9. Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK, 2010. "Noncooperative household consumption with caring," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces10.34, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    10. Rana Hendy & Catherine Sofer, 2010. "A Collective Model of Female Labor Supply : Do Distribution Factors Matter in the Egyptian Case ?," Post-Print halshs-00482492, HAL.
    11. Chris Klaveren & Bernard Praag & Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 2008. "A public good version of the collective household model: an empirical approach with an application to British household data," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 169-191, June.
    12. Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck & Javier Ruiz-Castillo , 2006. "Does the Representation of Household Behavior Matter for Welfare Analysis of Tax-benefit Policies? An Introduction," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 99-111, June.
    13. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock, 2011. "Revealed Preference Analysis of Non‐Cooperative Household Consumption," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(555), pages 1073-1096, September.
    14. Janet Currie, 2004. "Viewpoint: Child research comes of age," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 509-527, August.
    15. Vikki O’Neill & Stephane Hess, 2014. "Heterogeneity assumptions in the specification of bargaining models: a study of household level trade-offs between commuting time and salary," Transportation, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 745-763, July.
    16. Duha T. Altindag & John Nunley & Alan Seals, 2017. "Child-custody reform and the division of labor in the household," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 833-856, September.
    17. Leora Friedberg & Anthony Webb, 2006. "Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households," NBER Working Papers 12367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Patricia Apps & Ray Rees, 2007. "Household Models: An Historical Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 2172, CESifo.
    19. Jeremy Lise & Shannon Seitz, 2011. "Consumption Inequality and Intra-household Allocations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(1), pages 328-355.
    20. Dauphin, Anyck & El Lahga, Abdel-Rahmen & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 2006. "Choix de consommation des ménages en présence de plusieurs décideurs," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 82(1), pages 87-118, mars-juin.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consumer/Household Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q26 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Recreational Aspects of Natural Resources

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:ualbsp:24084. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/drualca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.