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Gender Bias in Parental Investments in Children’s Education: A Theoretical Analysis

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  • Silvia Pasqua

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Abstract

Human capital accumulation is one of the main engines of economic growth. Thus, many LDCs have introduced laws over the past 30 years for compulsory education and have increased their investment in public schooling. Nevertheless, the level of education in most poor countries is still very low, particularly for girls. The goal of this article is to develop a model of household decision-making in order to better understand what variables affect parents’ decision to educate girls less than boys. In the first part of the paper, a unitary model, a non-cooperative household model, and a bargaining model are developed and compared to explain factors that might produce gender bias in investment in education. As a result, the number of years of education for male and female children depends on the different costs and returns of educating girls and boys and, in the non-consensus models, on each parent’s preferences and decision power. The second part of the paper contains a simulation of the models assuming different policies for increasing women’s education using figures from the Living Standard Measurement Studies of Cote d’Ivoire. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Silvia Pasqua, 2005. "Gender Bias in Parental Investments in Children’s Education: A Theoretical Analysis," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 291-314, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:reveho:v:3:y:2005:i:3:p:291-314
    DOI: 10.1007/s11150-005-3459-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Branisa, Boris & Klasen, Stephan & Ziegler, Maria, 2013. "Gender Inequality in Social Institutions and Gendered Development Outcomes," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 252-268.
    2. Abrar ul haq, Muhammad & Mehtab, Nadia & Khan, Tasneem, 2012. "Gender Disparity in Economic Returns to Higher Education: Evidence from Private Formal Sector of Bahawalpur (Pakistan)," MPRA Paper 62958, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2012.
    3. Mussa, Richard, 2009. "Household economic status, schooling costs, and schooling bias against non-biological children in Malawi," MPRA Paper 15855, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Jun 2009.
    4. Hans Bloemen & Elena Stancanelli, 2015. "Toyboys or supergirls? An analysis of partners’ employment outcomes when she outearns him," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 501-530, September.
    5. Nicholas Awuse & Patrick Tandoh-Offin, 2014. "What factors Influence Internal migration and Wage Growth?: an Empirical Analysis of Private Formal Sector in Bolgatanga-Ghana," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 4(1), pages 23-31, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    education; gender bias; household bargaining model; D1; C78; J16;

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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