IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lvl/lacicr/0426.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Les modèles non-unitaires de comportement du ménage: un survol de la littérature

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre-André Chiappori
  • Olivier Donni

Abstract

Cet article s'intéresse aux modèles non-unitaires de comportement du ménage. Ces modèles supposent explicitement que le ménage est composé de plusieurs personnes ayant des préférences distinctes. Ils se classent alors en deux catégories principales: d'une part, les modèles coopératifs (ou collectifs), dans lesquels les allocations sont supposées efficaces au sens de Pareto, et d'autre part, les modèles non-coopératifs (ou stratégiques) qui s'appuient sur la notion d'équilibre de Cournot-Nash. Dans ces modèles, les fonctions qui caractérisent le comportement du ménage doivent satisfaire des contraintes différentes des traditionnelles conditions de Slutsky. De plus, dans certains cas particuliers, les préférences des membres du ménage peuvent être identifiées à partir du comportement observable.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2004. "Les modèles non-unitaires de comportement du ménage: un survol de la littérature," Cahiers de recherche 0426, CIRPEE.
  • Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0426
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cirpee.org/fileadmin/documents/Cahiers_2004/CIRPEE04-26.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2005. "Learning From a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," THEMA Working Papers 2006-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    2. Pollak, Robert A, 1977. "Price Dependent Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 64-75, March.
    3. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-1093, Nov.-Dec..
    4. Jonathan Seaton, 1997. "Neoclassical and collective rationality in household labour supply," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(8), pages 529-533.
    5. Rubalcava, L. & Thomas, D., 2000. "Family Bargaining and Welfare," Papers 00-10, RAND - Labor and Population Program.
    6. Peter Kooreman & Arie Kapteyn, 1990. "On the Empirical Implementation of Some Game Theoretic Models of Household Labor Supply," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 584-598.
    7. Jeremy Lise & Shannon Seitz, 2011. "Consumption Inequality and Intra-household Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 328-355.
    8. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Arthur Lewbel, 2013. "Estimating Consumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1267-1303.
    9. Stefan Dercon & Pramila Krishnan, 2000. "In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing within Households in Rural Ethiopia," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(4), pages 688-727, August.
    10. Haddad, Lawrence & Hoddinott, John & Alderman, Harold & DEC, 1994. "Intrahousehold resource allocation : an overview," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1255, The World Bank.
    11. Frederic Vermeulen, 2001. "And the winner is...: an Empirical Evaluation of Two Competing Approaches to Household Labour Supply," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 500566, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    12. Olivier Donni, 2004. "A Collective Model of Household Behavior with Private and Public Goods: Theory and Some Evidence from U.S. Data," Cahiers de recherche 0402, CIRPEE.
    13. Moehling, Carolyn M., 2005. "“She Has Suddenly Become Powerful†: Youth Employment and Household Decision Making in the Early Twentieth Century," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(2), pages 414-438, June.
    14. Alderman, Harold, et al, 1995. "Unitary versus Collective Models of the Household: Is It Time to Shift the Burden of Proof?," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, February.
    15. M. Browning & P. A. Chiappori, 1998. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1241-1278, November.
    16. Duncan Thomas, 1990. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 635-664.
    17. Frederic Vermeulen, 2006. "A collective model for female labour supply with non-participation and taxation," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(1), pages 99-118, February.
    18. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1991. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: A Rejoinder," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 761-762, August.
    19. Frederic Vermeulen, 2002. "Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 533-564, September.
    20. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-137, May.
    21. Chiara Rapallini, 2004. "Scelte di consumo e modello collettivo: test della razionalità collettiva e stima della regola di ripartizione con i dati italiani," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(5), pages 249-274, September.
    22. HansG. Bloemen, 2010. "An Empirical Model of Collective Household Labour Supply with Non-Participation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 183-214, March.
    23. Ligon, Ethan, 2002. "Dynamic Bargaining in Households (with application to Bangladesh)," CUDARE Working Papers 25102, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    24. Dauphin, Anyck & Fortin, Bernard, 2001. "A test of collective rationality for multi-person households," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 211-216, May.
    25. Browning, Martin, 2000. " The Saving Behaviour of a Two-Person Household," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(2), pages 235-251, June.
    26. Haddad, Lawrence & Kanbur, Ravi, 1992. "Intrahousehold inequality and the theory of targeting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 372-378, April.
    27. Apps, P. F. & Rees, R., 1996. "Labour supply, household production and intra-family welfare distribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 199-219, May.
    28. Richard Blundell & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Thierry Magnac & Costas Meghir, 2007. "Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Non-Participation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 417-445.
    29. Lundberg, Shelly & Startza, Richard & Stillman, Steven, 2003. "The retirement-consumption puzzle: a marital bargaining approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1199-1218, May.
    30. Duncan Thomas, 1994. "Like Father, like Son; Like Mother, like Daughter: Parental Resources and Child Height," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 29(4), pages 950-988.
    31. Bourguignon, Francois & Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective models of household behavior : An introduction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 355-364, April.
    32. Paul A. Samuelson, 1956. "Social Indifference Curves," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 1-22.
    33. Bernarda Zamora, 2002. "The Spanish Sharing Rule," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    34. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1990. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Reply," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 237-242, February.
    35. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
    36. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 539-591, May.
    37. François Bourguignon & Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 1993. "Intra Household Allocation of Consumption: A Model and some Evidence from French Data," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 29, pages 137-156.
    38. Lundberg, Shelly & Startza, Richard & Stillman, Steven, 2003. "The retirement-consumption puzzle: a marital bargaining approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1199-1218, May.
    39. Luo, Guo Ying, 2002. "Collective Decision-Making and Heterogeneity in Tastes," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 20(2), pages 213-226, April.
    40. Brett, Craig, 1998. "Tax reform and collective family decision-making," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 425-440, December.
    41. Browning, Martin & Meghir, Costas, 1991. "The Effects of Male and Female Labor Supply on Commodity Demands," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 925-951, July.
    42. Altonji, Joseph G & Hayashi, Fumio & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1992. "Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests Using Micro Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1177-1198, December.
    43. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    44. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    45. Kai A. Konrad & Kjell Erik Lommerud, 2000. "The bargaining family revisited," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(2), pages 471-487, May.
    46. Apps, Patricia F. & Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the household," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 355-369, April.
    47. Olivier Donni, 2007. "Collective female labour supply: theory and application," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 94-119, January.
    48. Haddad, Lawrence & Kanbur, Ravi, 1992. "Is There an Intrahousehold Kuznets Curve? Some Evidence from the Philippines," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 47(Supplemen), pages 77-93.
    49. FranÚois Bourguignon, 1999. "The cost of children: May the collective approach to household behavior help?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 12(4), pages 503-521.
    50. Thomas Aronsson & Sven-Olov Daunfeldt & Magnus Wikström, 2001. "Estimating intrahousehold allocation in a collective model with household production," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 14(4), pages 569-584.
    51. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
    52. Grossbard,Shoshana A. (ed.), 2003. "Marriage and the Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521814546.
    53. Orazio Attanasio & Valerie Lechene, 2002. "Tests of Income Pooling in Household Decisions," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(4), pages 720-748, October.
    54. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 1996. "Economics in a Family Way," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(4), pages 1903-1934, December.
    55. Vermeulen, Frederic, 2002. "Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 533-564, September.
    56. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Haddad, Lawrence & Hoddinott, John & Kanbur, Ravi, 1993. "Unitary versus collective models of the household : time to shift theburden of proof?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1217, The World Bank.
    57. Olivier Donni & Nicolas Moreau, 2007. "Collective Labor Supply: A Single-Equation Model and Some Evidence from French Data," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 42(1).
    58. Kooreman, Peter, 1994. "Estimation of Econometric Models of Some Discrete Games," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(3), pages 255-268, July-Sept.
    59. Kanbur, Ravi & Haddad, Lawrence, 1994. "Are Better Off Households More Unequal or Less Unequal?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 445-458, July.
    60. Basu, Kaushik & Ray, Ranjan, 2002. "The collective model of the household and an unexpected implication for child labor : hypothesis and an empirical test," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2813, The World Bank.
    61. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Nash-Bargained Households Decisions: A Comment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(4), pages 791-796, November.
    62. Kaushik Basu, 2006. "Gender and Say: a Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined Balance of Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(511), pages 558-580, April.
    63. Vermeulen, Frederic & Watteyne, André, 2006. "Quand un et un ne font plus deux," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 82(1), pages 155-180, mars-juin.
    64. Maurizio Mazzocco, 2007. "Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a Test of Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 857-895.
    65. Pollak, Robert A, 1985. "A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 581-608, June.
    66. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2001. "Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 347-368.
    67. repec:adr:anecst:y:1993:i:29:p:07 is not listed on IDEAS
    68. Maurizio Mazzocco, 2004. "Individual Euler Equations Rather Than Household Euler Equations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 497, Econometric Society.
    69. Hélène Couprie, 2007. "Time allocation within the Family: Welfare implications of life in a couple," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 287-305, January.
    70. Grossbard,Shoshana A. (ed.), 2003. "Marriage and the Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521891431.
    71. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 1996. "Economics in a Family Way," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(4), pages 1903-1934, December.
    72. Richard Blundell & Pierre-André Chiappori & Costas Meghir, 2005. "Collective Labor Supply with Children," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(6), pages 1277-1306, December.
    73. Ian Preston, 2000. "Departures from Slutsky Symmetry in Household Demand Models," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1809, Econometric Society.
    74. Apps, Patricia F & Rees, Ray, 1997. "Collective Labor Supply and Household Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 178-190, February.
    75. Martin Browning & Valérie Lechene, 2001. "Caring and Sharing: Tests Between Alternative Models of Intra-household Allocation," Discussion Papers 01-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    76. Jonathan Seaton, 2001. "Bargaining versus non-cooperation; transaction costs within marriage," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 37-41.
    77. Shelly J. Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak & Terence J. Wales, 1997. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(3), pages 463-480.
    78. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-467, June.
    79. Hayashi, Fumio & Altonji, Joseph & Kotlikoff, Laurence, 1996. "Risk-Sharing between and within Families," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 261-294, March.
    80. Shelley Phipps & Peter Burton, 1995. "Social/institutional variables and behavior within households: An empirical test using the Luxembourg income study," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(1), pages 151-174.
    81. Bernarda Zamora, 2003. "Female Labor Participation and the Allocation of Household Expenditure. Evidence on Spanish Data," Microeconomics 0302004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    82. Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak, 2003. "Efficiency in Marriage," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 153-167, September.
    83. Valerie Lechene & Ian Preston & University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2000. "Departures from Slutsky Symmetry in Noncooperative Household Demand Models," Economics Series Working Papers 52, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    84. Patricia Apps & Glenn Jones, 1986. "Selective taxation of couples," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-15, December.
    85. Konrad, Kai A & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1995. " Family Policy with Non-cooperative Families," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 581-601, December.
    86. T. Paul Schultz, 1990. "Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and Fertility," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 599-634.
    87. Behrman, Jere R, 1988. "Intrahousehold Allocation of Nutrients in Rural India: Are Boys Favored? Do Parents Exhibit Inequality Aversion?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 32-54, March.
    88. Peter Kooreman, 2000. "The Labeling Effect of a Child Benefit System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 571-583, June.
    89. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 1998. "Household Labor Supply, Sharing Rule and the Marriage Market," Cahiers de recherche 9810, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
    90. Ligon, Ethan, 2002. "Dynamic bargaining in households (with an application to Bangladesh)," CUDARE Working Paper Series 972, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
    91. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
    92. Apps, Patricia, 1982. "Institutional inequality and tax incidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 217-242, July.
    93. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
    94. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1989. "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1138-1159, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Frederic Vermeulen & André Watteyne, 2003. "Quand un et un ne font plus deux: calcul d'échelles d'équivalence intra-familiales au moyen d'un modèle collectif," Public Economics Working Paper Series wpechco, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Working Group Public Economics.
    2. Luc Arrondel & Nicolas Frémeaux, 2013. ""For richer, for poorer": savings preferences and choice of spouse," PSE Working Papers halshs-00786245, HAL.
    3. Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck & Javier Ruiz-Castillo , 2006. "Does the Representation of Household Behavior Matter for Welfare Analysis of Tax-benefit Policies? An Introduction," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 99-111, June.
    4. Hélène Couprie & Gaëlle Ferrant, 2015. "Welfare Comparisons, Economies of Scale and Equivalence Scale in Time Use," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 117-118, pages 185-210.
    5. Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix & Anyck Dauphin & Abdel-Rahmen El Lahga, 2004. "Choix de consommation des ménages en présence de plusieurs décideurs," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-63, CIRANO.
    6. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Bargain, Olivier & Moreau, Nicolas, 2005. "Cooperative Models in Action: Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 1480, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Karine Briard, 2020. "L’élasticité de l’offre de travail des femmes en France. Petite revue de méthodes et de résultats," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(5), pages 39-72.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2009. "Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 4603, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck & Javier Ruiz-Castillo , 2006. "Does the Representation of Household Behavior Matter for Welfare Analysis of Tax-benefit Policies? An Introduction," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 99-111, June.
    4. Xu, Zeyu, 2007. "A survey on intra-household models and evidence," MPRA Paper 3763, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Chiuri, Maria Concetta, 2000. "Individual decisions and household demand for consumption and leisure," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 277-324, September.
    6. Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK, 2010. "Noncooperative household consumption with caring," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces10.34, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    7. Keita, Moussa, 2011. "Influence de la négociation intra-ménage sur les dépenses d’éducation dans les ménages au Mali [Influence of intra-household bargaining on education expenditures in households in Mali]," MPRA Paper 57592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Patricia Apps & Ray Rees, 2007. "Household Models: An Historical Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 2172, CESifo.
    9. Matthias Doepke & Michèle Tertilt, 2019. "Does female empowerment promote economic development?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 309-343, December.
    10. Jaime Andrés Sarmiento Espinel, 2012. "Parental investment in their children’s education," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2012-09, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
    11. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock, 2011. "Revealed Preference Analysis of Non‐Cooperative Household Consumption," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(555), pages 1073-1096, September.
    12. Frederic Vermeulen, 2002. "Collective Household Models: Principles and Main Results," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 533-564, September.
    13. Jara-Díaz, Sergio & Rosales-Salas, Jorge, 2017. "Beyond transport time: A review of time use modeling," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-230.
    14. Rana Hendy & Catherine Sofer, 2010. "A Collective Model of Female Labor Supply : Do Distribution Factors Matter in the Egyptian Case ?," Post-Print halshs-00482492, HAL.
    15. Robert Pollak, 2003. "Gary Becker's Contributions to Family and Household Economics," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 111-141, January.
    16. Jaime Andres Sarmiento Espinel, 2012. "Children and non-participation in a model of collective household labor supply," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2012-14, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
    17. Bargain, Olivier & Moreau, Nicolas, 2005. "Cooperative Models in Action: Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 1480, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    18. Nicolas Moreau, 2001. "Approches pluri-décisionnelles de la famille," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 15(4), pages 145-185.
    19. Donni, Olivier, 2006. "Les modèles non coopératifs d’offre de travail : théorie et évidence," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 82(1), pages 181-206, mars-juin.
    20. Duha T. Altindag & John Nunley & Alan Seals, 2017. "Child-custody reform and the division of labor in the household," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 833-856, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ménage; modèle collectif; modèle stratégique; testabilité; identifiabilité;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0426. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Manuel Paradis (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cirpeca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.