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Les modèles non-unitaires de comportement du ménage: un survol de la littérature

  • Pierre-André Chiappori
  • Olivier Donni

Cet article s'intéresse aux modèles non-unitaires de comportement du ménage. Ces modèles supposent explicitement que le ménage est composé de plusieurs personnes ayant des préférences distinctes. Ils se classent alors en deux catégories principales: d'une part, les modèles coopératifs (ou collectifs), dans lesquels les allocations sont supposées efficaces au sens de Pareto, et d'autre part, les modèles non-coopératifs (ou stratégiques) qui s'appuient sur la notion d'équilibre de Cournot-Nash. Dans ces modèles, les fonctions qui caractérisent le comportement du ménage doivent satisfaire des contraintes différentes des traditionnelles conditions de Slutsky. De plus, dans certains cas particuliers, les préférences des membres du ménage peuvent être identifiées à partir du comportement observable.

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Paper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0426.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0426
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