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"For richer, for poorer": savings preferences and choice of spouse

Author

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  • Luc Arrondel

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Nicolas Frémeaux

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

Do couples share the same values? The social sciences have mainly concentrated on comparing the socioeconomic characteristics of spouses, but rarely their preferences to risk and time. In this paper, we use conventional measurements and an original method. We find that spouses are very similar in their savings preferences, even when we control for the individual characteristics. These conclusions are decisive in explaining wealth inequalities between households, since homogamy causes a divide in the population. However, if the correlation between preferences and wealth is clear when measured at the household level, spouses with opposite attitudes tend to be richer for some parameters.

Suggested Citation

  • Luc Arrondel & Nicolas Frémeaux, 2013. ""For richer, for poorer": savings preferences and choice of spouse," Working Papers halshs-00786245, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00786245
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00786245v3
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    1. Luc Arrondel & André Masson, 2013. "Measuring savers' preferences how and why?," Working Papers halshs-00834203, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Homogamy; Savings Preferences; Household Wealth; Inequalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis

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