Intra Household Allocation of Consumption : A Model and Some Evidence from French Data
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we reproduce upon French data previous tests of the so-called "income pooling" hypothesis, a consequence of traditional models of household behaviour according to which only total income -- and not income distribution across members -- should matter. We find that income pooling is rejected: for a given level of total income, the share of husband's and wife's own income significantly affects the structure of consumption. Our second purpose is more innovative. We construct a theoretical model of collective decision making, based upon the efficiency assumption of collective decision making. Both our setting and the traditional, household preference model can be nested within a family of functional forms. The collective model generates specific restrictions upon the parameters that can the tested. Those restrictions turn out not to be rejected by the data.
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|Date of creation:||1992|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Annales d'Economie et Statistiques, 1993, 29, pp. 137-156|
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