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A collective household labor supply model with children and non-participation: Theory and empirical application

Author

Listed:
  • Jaime Andres Sarmiento Espinel

    () (Universidad Militar Nueva Granada)

  • Edwin van Gameren

    () (El Colegio de México)

Abstract

We extend the collective model of household behavior to consider public consumption (expenditures on children), together with non-participation in the labor market. Identification of individual preferences and the sharing rule from observing each individual’s labor supply and the total expenditure on the public good rests on the existence of a distribution factor and the existence and uniqueness of individual reservation wages at which both members are indifferent whether a member participates or not. Using a sample of Mexican nuclear families, collective rationality is not rejected. No evidence is found that empowering mothers is more beneficial for children than empowering fathers.

Suggested Citation

  • Jaime Andres Sarmiento Espinel & Edwin van Gameren, 2016. "A collective household labor supply model with children and non-participation: Theory and empirical application," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos 2016-11, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.
  • Handle: RePEc:emx:ceedoc:2016-11
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    File URL: http://cee.colmex.mx/images/Documentos-de-trabajo-2016/DTCEEXI2016.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    collective models; labor supply; non-participation; public goods; children; intrahousehold decision-making; reservation wages; sharing rule;

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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