Collective household labor supply: nonparticipation and income taxation
In this paper, we adopt the usual assumptions of the collective approach, i.e. individualism and efficiency, to study household labor supply. The theoretical innovation is twofold. First, we incorporate the decision to participate in the labor market in the initial setting. Second, we abandon the assumption of linearity of the budget constraint. We show that (i) structural elements such as preferences or the outcome of the decision process can be recovered, and (ii) testable restrictions are generated from the observation of the household labor supplies. We also examine, for this model, how to simulate the incidence of fiscal reforms. Dans cet article, nous adoptons les hypothèses habituelles de l'approche collective, à savoir, l'individualisme et l'efficacité, pour étudier l'offre de travail du ménage. L'innovation théorique est double. D'une part, nous incorporons dans le cadre initial la décision de participer au marché du travail. D'autre part, nous abandonnons l'hypothèse de linéarité de la contrainte budgetaire. Nous montrons alors que (i) des éléments structurels du processus de décision peuvent être retrouvés, et (ii) des restrictions testables sont générées de l'observation des offres de travail du ménage. Nous examinons également, pour ce modèle, comment faire des simulations de réformes fiscales.
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- Richard Blundell & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Thierry Magnac & Costas Meghir, 2007.
"Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Non-Participation,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 417-445.
- Richard Blundell & Pierre-André Chiappori & Thierry Magnac & Costas Meghir, 1998. "Collective labour supply: heterogeneity and non-participation," IFS Working Papers W98/20, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Blundell, Richard William & Chiappori, Pierre-André & Magnac, Thierry & Meghir, Costas, 2005. "Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Non-Participation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Blundell, Richard & Chiappori, Pierre-André & Magnac, Thierry & Meghir, Costas, 2005. "Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation," IDEI Working Papers 373, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Richard Blundell & Pierre-André Chiappori & Thierry Magnac & Costas Meghir, 2001. "Collective Labor Supply : Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation," Working Papers 2001-32, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Blundell, Richard & Chiappori, Pierre-André & Magnac, Thierry & Meghir, Costas, 2005. "Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation," IZA Discussion Papers 1785, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Richard Blundell & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Thierry Magnac & Costas Meghir, 2002. "Collective Labor Supply: Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation," Research Unit Working Papers 0210, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
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- Olivier Donni, 2007. "Collective female labour supply: theory and application," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 94-119, 01.
- Olivier Donni, 2001. "Collective Female Labor Supply: Theory and Application," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 141, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Donni, Olivier, 2005. "Collective Female Labour Supply: Theory and Application," IZA Discussion Papers 1506, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the Household," Munich Reprints in Economics 3411, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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- Chiappori, Pierre-André & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," Cahiers de recherche 0103, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-16, CIRANO.
- Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-467, June.
- Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
- Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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