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Marriage with Labor Supply

  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    ()

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)

  • Jean-Marc Robin

    ()

    (Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

We propose a search-matching model of the marriage market that extends Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium when exogenous divorce is the only source of risk. The estimated matching probabilities that can be derived from the steady-state flow conditions are strongly increasing in both male and female wages. We estimate that the share of marriage surplus appropriated by the man increases with his wage and that the share appropriated by the woman decreases with her wage. We find that leisure is an inferior good for men and a normal good for women.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00639313.

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Date of creation: Oct 2011
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Publication status: Published in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2011.50 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2011
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00639313
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00639313
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