Structural Estimation of Marriage Models
A structural approach is used to examine who matches with whom. A two-sided matching model that allows for marital sorting in response to marriage market flexibility and agents' preferences is utilized. Estimation is based on imbedding the numerical solution of a matching model within a maximum likelihood procedure. Results indicate that wage is more desirable than education in predicting marriageability for white men; education is more desirable for black men. The marriage market for white men is more flexible. Both marriage market flexibility and the chance of being classified correctly using agents' wage and education decrease with age for white men.
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