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Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching

  • Ran Abramitzky
  • Adeline Delavande
  • Luis Vasconcelos

We assemble a novel dataset to study the impact of male scarcity on marital assortative matching and other marriage market outcomes using the large shock that WWI caused to the number of French men. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that postwar in regions with higher mortality rates: men were less likely to marry women of lower social classes; men were more likely and women less likely to marry; out-of-wedlock births increased; divorce rates decreased; and the age gap decreased. These findings are consistent with men improving their position in the marriage market as they become scarcer. (JEL J12, J16, N34)

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 124-57

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:3:y:2011:i:3:p:124-57
Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.3.3.124
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