Lifecycle marriage matching: Theory and Evidence
estimated model shows that a concern for accumulating marriage specific capital is quantitatively significant in generating positive assortative matching in spousal ages at marriage, gender differences in spousal ages at marriage, and a preference for early marriage. Gender variations in population supplies due to gender specific mortality rates and entry cohort sizes have offsetting quantitative effects.
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