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Who Marries Whom and Why

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  • Eugene Choo
  • Aloysius Siow

Abstract

This paper proposes and estimates a static transferable utility model of the marriage market. The model generates a nonparametric marriage matching function with spillover effects. It rationalizes the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions and points out its limitations. The model was used to estimate U.S. marital behavior in 1971/72 and 1981/82. The marriage matching function estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell substantially over the decade. Unlike contradictory marriage rate regression results, the marriage matching function estimates showed that the legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage for young men and women.

Suggested Citation

  • Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:114:y:2006:i:1:p:175-201
    DOI: 10.1086/498585
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rao, Vijayendra, 1993. "The Rising Price of Husbands: A Hedonic Analysis of Dowry Increases in Rural India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 666-677, August.
    2. Ermisch, John & Ogawa, Naohiro (ed.), 1994. "The Family, the Market, and the State in Ageing Societies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288183, Decembrie.
    3. Maristella Botticini & Aloysius Siow, 2003. "Why Dowries?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1385-1398, September.
    4. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    5. Yatchew,Adonis, 2003. "Semiparametric Regression for the Applied Econometrician," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521812832, June.
    6. Linda Y. Wong, 2003. "An Empirical Study of Darwin's Theory of Mate Choice," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 128, Society for Computational Economics.
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