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Sex selection and gender balance

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  • Bhaskar, V

Abstract

We model sex selection and the equilibrium sex ratio, when parents care about their child's marriage prospects. With intrinsic son preference, selection results in a male-biased sex ratio. This is inefficient, due to a marriage market congestion externality. Medical innovations that facilitate selection aggravate the inefficiency. If son preference arises endogenously, due to population growth causing an excess supply of women on the marriage market, selection may improve welfare. Empirically, sex selection causes an excess of males and reduces welfare in China. In India, rising cohort sizes give rise to an excess of women in most parts of the country.

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  • Bhaskar, V, 2010. "Sex selection and gender balance," MPRA Paper 22698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:22698
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kevin B. Grier & Daniel L. Hicks & Weici Yuan, 2016. "Marriage Market Matching And Conspicuous Consumption In China," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 1251-1262, April.
    2. V. Bhaskar & Ed Hopkins, 2016. "Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Premarital Investments with Assortative Matching," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 992-1045.
    3. d’Albis, Hippolyte & de la Croix, David, 2012. "Missing daughters, missing brides?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 358-360.
    4. Claus C Pörtner, 2010. "Sex Selective Abortions, Fertility and Birth Spacing," Working Papers UWEC-2010-04-R, University of Washington, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2010.
    5. Shang-Jin Wei & Xiaobo Zhang, 2011. "Sex Ratios, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth in the People's Republic of China," NBER Working Papers 16800, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Emla Fitzsimons & Bansi Malde, 2014. "Empirically probing the quantity–quality model," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 33-68, January.
    7. Bhaskar, Venkataraman, 2015. "The Demographic Transition and the Position of Women: A Marriage Market Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 10619, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Xu, Bing & Pak, Maxwell, 2015. "Gender ratio under China's two-child policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 289-307.
    9. S. Anukriti, 2013. "The Fertility-Sex Ratio Tradeoff: Unintended Consequences of Financial Incentives," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 827, Boston College Department of Economics.
    10. V. Bhaskar, 2011. "Corrigendum: Sex Selection and Gender Balance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 252-253, May.
    11. Xing Li & M. W. Luke Chan & Byron G. Spencer & Wei Yang, 2016. "Does the marriage market sex ratio affect parental sex selection? Evidence from the Chinese census," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 29(4), pages 1063-1082, October.
    12. Zaki Wahhaj, 2015. "A Theory of Child Marriage," Studies in Economics 1520, School of Economics, University of Kent.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    gender discrimination; sex selection; marriage markets; sex ratios;

    JEL classification:

    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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