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Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply

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  • Pierre-André Chiappori
  • Bernard Fortin
  • Guy Lacroix

Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply. In our approach, the sex ratio on the marragie market and the rules governing divorce are examples of distribution factors. The latter are defined as variables that affect the household members' bargaining position but neither preferences nor the joint budget set. We extend the collective labor supply model developped by Chiappori (JPE, 1992) to allow for distribution factors. We show that our model imposes new restrictions on the labor supply functions and eases the identification of individual preferences and the intra-household decision process. The model is estimated using PSID data for the year 1988. Our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model. Also, the sex ratio and divorce laws deemed favorable to women are found to impact the labor supply behavior and the decision process in the directions predicted by the theory and to have sizeable effects. Cet article présente un cadre théorique visant à analyser l'impact du marché du mariage et des règles de divorce sur l'offre de travail du ménage. Dans notre approche, l'importance relative des hommes sur le marché du mariage ainsi que les lois régissant le divorce sont des exemples de facteurs de distribution. Ceux-ci sont définis comme étant des variables qui influencent le pouvoir de négociation des conjoints0501s n'ont pas d'effet sur les préférences individuelles ni sur l'ensemble de consommation du ménage. Nous généralisons le modèle d'offre de travail collectif de Chiappori (JPE, 1992) de façon à tenir compte des facteurs de distribution. Nous montrons que notre modèle impose de nouvelles restrictions sur les fonctions d'offre de travail des conjoints et facilite l'identification des préférences individuelles ainsi que le processus de décision intra-familial. Le modèle est estimé par la méthode des moments généralisés à l'aide des données du PSID pour 1988. Nos résultats ne rejettent pas les restrictions imposées par notre approche. De plus, l'importance relative des hommes de même que les règles de divorce jugées favorables aux femmes influencent les comportements d'offre de travail et le processus de décision dans les directions prédites par la théorie et jouent un rôle important dans les choix du ménage.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-16, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collective model; household labor supply; marriage market; divorce laws; Modèle collectif; offre de travail du ménage; marché du mariage; lois du divorce;

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General

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