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Child-Custody Reform and the Division of Labor in the Household

  • John M. Nunley
  • Richard Alan Seals Jr.

We investigate whether a change in the expectation of child custody affects the amount of time that married mothers and fathers devote to market and household work. Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) coupled with plausibly exogenous variation in the adoption of joint-custody laws across states and time allow us to examine how the prospect of shared child custody affects within-marriage time allocation. We exploit the longitudinal feature of the PSID to adjust our estimates for sample selection based on the reform’s potential impact on the composition of the married couples. We find that custody reform induces a reallocation of time within marriage, with mothers working more in the market and fathers working more in the home.

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File URL: http://cla.auburn.edu/econwp/Archives/2011/2011-14.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Auburn University in its series Auburn Economics Working Paper Series with number auwp2011-14.

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Date of creation: Oct 2011
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Handle: RePEc:abn:wpaper:auwp2011-14
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