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Child-Custody Reform and Marriage-Specific Investment in Children

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  • Nunley, John M.
  • Seals, Alan

Abstract

Research on child custody primarily focuses on the well-being of children following divorce. We extend this literature by examining how the prospect of joint child custody affects marriage-specific investment in children’s private-school education. Variation in the timing of joint-custody reforms across states proxies for the prospect of joint child custody and provides a natural experiment framework with which to examine marriage-specific investment in children. The probability of children’s private school attendance declines by 13 percent in states that adopt joint-custody laws. The effects of joint-custody reform are larger in states that have property-division laws that consistently favor one parent over the other. The results are largely robust for subsamples partitioned by socioeconomic status.

Suggested Citation

  • Nunley, John M. & Seals, Alan, 2009. "Child-Custody Reform and Marriage-Specific Investment in Children," MPRA Paper 16313, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:16313
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    child-custody laws; household bargaining; marriage-specific investment; private school attendance; property-division laws;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law

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