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The Economics of Child Custody

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  • IMRAN RASUL

Abstract

I develop a model of marriage in which spouses decide on investments in child quality during marriage, and on the allocation of child custody should they divorce. The custodial allocation determines the share of the marital surplus each spouse appropriates, which in turn influences spouses' investment incentives. The custodial allocation therefore has both distributional and efficiency consequences. I derive the equilibrium investments and optimal custodial allocation, and identify three channels through which making divorce easier affects child welfare: investments in child quality during marriage, the likelihood of divorce, and the allocation of custody if divorce occurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Imran Rasul, 2006. "The Economics of Child Custody," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 73(289), pages 1-25, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:73:y:2006:i:289:p:1-25
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00445.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francesconi, Marco & Muthoo, Abhinay, 2003. "An Economic Model of Child Custody," IZA Discussion Papers 857, IZA Network @ LISER.
    2. Rainer, Helmut, 2007. "Should we write prenuptial contracts?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 337-363, February.
    3. Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak, 2003. "Efficiency in Marriage," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 153-167, September.
    4. Plamen Nikolov & Karen Gardiner & Mike Fishman, 2003. "State Policies to promote marriage," HEW 0306003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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