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On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis

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  • Eric Langlais

    (University of Nancy 2, UFR AES ; Economix-CNRS and CEREFIGE - Nancy)

Abstract

In this paper, the unilateral divorce law is modelled trough the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and alternative compensation rules benefiting to the parent having custody of the children. Their influence are studied both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce and in the long run (selection of marriages). We show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on the marriage contracting; particularly when consideration of parents' altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted when the cost of divorces decreases.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Langlais, 2010. "On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2010031, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2010031
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2010031.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smith, Ian, 1997. "Explaining the Growth of Divorce in Great Britain," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 44(5), pages 519-544, November.
    2. Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2006. "Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in divorce law," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 423-439, December.
    3. Rainer, Helmut, 2007. "Should we write prenuptial contracts?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 337-363, February.
    4. Jonathan Gardner & Andrew J. Oswald, 2006. "Do divorcing couples become happier by breaking up?," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 169(2), pages 319-336, March.
    5. Stéphane Mechoulan, 2005. "“Economic Theory’s Stance On No-Fault Divorce”," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 337-359, September.
    6. Giulio Fella & Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2004. "Does Divorce Law Matter?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(4), pages 607-633, June.
    7. Clark, Simon, 1999. "Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages 41-54, March.
    8. François Legendre & Florence Thibault, 2007. "Les concubins et l’impôt sur le revenu en France," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 401(1), pages 3-21.
    9. Dominique Anxo & Lennart Flood & Yusuf Kocoglu, 2002. "Offre de travail et répartition des activités domestiques et parentales au sein du couple : une comparaison entre la France et la Suède," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 352(1), pages 127-150.
    10. Katarina Nordblom, 2004. "Cohabitation and Marriage in a Risky World," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 325-340, April.
    11. Antony Dnes, "undated". "The Life-profile Theory of Marriage, Cohabitation, and Same-sex Marriage," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1079, American Law & Economics Association.
    12. Stéphane Mechoulan, 2006. "Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 143-174, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fisher, H., 2011. "Divorce Property Division and the Decision to Marry or Cohabit," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1101, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage models; unilateral divorce law; the parents’ altruism and protective measure for children;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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