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Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Cigno

Abstract

Neither marriage nor a legally enforceable contract serves any useful purpose if the parties have access to a perfect credit market. In the presence of credit rationing, the parties may not reach an agreement. If they do, the agreement will be inefficient and give one party more utility than the other. Efficiency and utility equalization are guaranteed only by a legally enforceable contract. Separate-property marriage may reduce, and community-property marriage actually eliminate inefficiency, but neither of them guarantees utility equalization. (JEL codes: C78, J12, K36)

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Cigno, 2014. "Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 60(3), pages 599-612.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:60:y:2014:i:3:p:599-612.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ift010
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    Cited by:

    1. Ho Lun Wong, 2021. "Effect of marriage registration on fertility and intrahousehold distribution in Thailand," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 312-338, August.
    2. Cigno, A., 2016. "Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-660, Elsevier.
    3. Gahramanov Emin & Gaibulloev Khusrav & Younas Javed, 2019. "Parental Transfers, Intra-household Bargaining and Fertility Decision," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-17, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law

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