Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?
Neither marriage nor a legally enforceable contract serves any useful purpose if the parties have access to a perfect credit market. In the presence of credit rationing, efficiency and utility equalization are guaranteed only by a legally enforceable contract. Separate-property marriage may reduce and community-property marriage actually eliminate inefficiency, but neither of them guarantees utility equalization.
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