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Marriage, Commitment and Divorce in a Matching Model with Differential Aging

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  • Adrian Masters

    (SUNY Albany)

Abstract

This paper analyses a matching model of the marriage market with directed, on-the-job search. Everyone is born attractive but "matures" according to a Poisson process into unattractiveness. Marriages between equally attractive people are stable but mixed marriages are not. The implied patterns of marriage and divorce are consistent with those identified in the empirical literature. When the utility from being single is low, in order to commit to their relationship, attractive people in mixed marriages may voluntarily divest of their attractiveness. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Adrian Masters, 2008. "Marriage, Commitment and Divorce in a Matching Model with Differential Aging," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 614-628, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:05-61
    DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2007.08.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Tracy J. Cornelius, 2003. "A Search Model of Marriage and Divorce," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 135-155, January.
    11. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1998. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 257-273, May.
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    14. Masters, Adrian M, 1999. "Wage Posting in Two-Sided Search and the Minimum Wage," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 809-826, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cigno, A., 2016. "Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-660, Elsevier.
    2. Mario Vozar, 2010. "The Effect of Time in a Multi-Dimensional Marriage Market Model," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp417, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    3. Fernandez-Kranz, Daniel & Nollenberger, Natalia, 2022. "The impact of equal parenting time laws on family outcomes and risky behavior by teenagers: Evidence from Spain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 303-325.
    4. Alessandro Cigno, 2012. "Marriage as a commitment device," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 193-213, June.
    5. Roberto Bonilla & Alberto Trejos, 2015. "Marriage, Employment Participation and Home Production in Search Equilibrium," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA, vol. 0(1), pages 1-23, january-j.
    6. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2008. "An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage," IZA Discussion Papers 3892, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Alessandro Cigno, 2014. "Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 60(3), pages 599-612.
    8. Pieter A. Gautier & Michael Svarer & Coen N. Teulings, 2007. "Sin City?," CAM Working Papers 2007-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
    9. Coles, Melvyn & Francesconi, Marco, 2007. "On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 2612, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Mehdi Ghezelseflo & Rezvanoosadat Jazayeri & Fatemeh Bahrami & Rahmatollah Mohammadi Fesharaki, 2016. "The Role of Relational Maintenance Behavior and Attachment Styles in Predicting Marital Commitment," Asian Social Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 12(9), pages 223-223, September.
    11. Tie-Ying Liu & Hsu-Ling Chang & Chi-Wei Su, 2017. "Why do People Get Married? An Inframarginal Perspective," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 1281-1295, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Marriage; Matching; Directed search;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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