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Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models

Author

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  • Merkl, Christian

    () (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg)

  • van Rens, Thijs

    () (University of Warwick)

Abstract

Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standard search models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired. We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphic to a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selective hiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costs of unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequally across workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfare is lower if hiring is selective.

Suggested Citation

  • Merkl, Christian & van Rens, Thijs, 2012. "Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models," IZA Discussion Papers 6294, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6294
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kohlbrecher, Britta & Merkl, Christian & Nordmeier, Daniela, 2016. "Revisiting the matching function," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 350-374.
    2. Regis Barnichon & Andrew Figura, 2015. "Labor Market Heterogeneity and the Aggregate Matching Function," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 222-249, October.
    3. Modestino, Alicia Sasser & Shoag, Daniel & Ballance, Joshua, 2015. "Upskilling: Do Employers Demand Greater Skill When Workers Are Plentiful?," Working Paper Series rwp15-013, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    4. Sengul, Gonul, 2017. "Effect of labor market policies on unemployment when firms adapt their recruitment strategy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 169-179.
    5. Ismail Baydur, 2017. "Worker Selection, Hiring, and Vacancies," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 88-127, January.
    6. Modestino, Alicia Sasser & Shoag, Daniel & Ballance, Joshua, 2015. "Upskilling: do employers demand greater skill when skilled workers are plentiful?," Working Papers 14-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    labor market models; welfare; optimal unemployment insurance;

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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