A Search Model of Marriage and Divorce
This paper analyses long term partnership formation in a marriage market in which individuals continue to search for partners while matched. Individuals prefer relationships which offer more instantaneous utility but they also prefer more stable relationships. A relationship is more stable for one partner if there is less chance that the other partner will leave. An individual is more inclined to leave a relationship which offers less instantaneous utility and less stability. Since both partners are making these evaluations, the stability of the relationship for one companion depends on the stability of the relationship for the other and as such, separation rates are endogenous. It is shown that these feedback effects in search strategies generate a new type of multiple equilibria in which particular matches can be either stable or unstable depending on individuals beliefs. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Volume (Year): 6 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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