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Optimal dynamic path of effort on marriage: differences between arranged and love marriages

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  • Xuemei Liu

Abstract

People benefit from good marriages. Thus, everyone is willing to put effort into marriage to improve the quality of marriage. However, effort is costly. Then everyone faces the same question: how much effort should I put into marriage? A dynamic optimal control model is used in trying to answer this question. The study shows that for arranged marriages that start with little love, an agent should devote a great deal of effort to marriage in the very beginning, and then reduce the effort until a steady state level. However, for love marriages that start with deep love, there is no need for an agent to devote as much effort as in the steady state. The agent should start to put low effort on marriage, high effort on other activities, and continuously increase the effort on marriage up to the steady state level.

Suggested Citation

  • Xuemei Liu, 2007. "Optimal dynamic path of effort on marriage: differences between arranged and love marriages," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 49-52.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:14:y:2007:i:1:p:49-52
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850500425691
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 1999. "A dynamic and stochastic analysis of decision making in arranged marriages," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(7), pages 439-442.
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    5. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Hamid Beladi, 2002. "Arranged or love marriage? That is the question," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(13), pages 893-897.
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    1. Batabyal, Amitrajeet & Yoo, Seung Jick, 2016. "Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," MPRA Paper 74745, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Man Si, 2015. "Intrafamily bargaining and love," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 771-789, December.

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