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Marriage, Divorce and Interstate Risk Sharing

  • Martin Halla
  • Johann Scharler

In this paper we study the importance of marriage for interstate risk sharing. We find that US states in which married couples account for a higher share of the population are less exposed to state-specific output shocks. Thus, marriages do not just improve the allocation of risk at the individual level, but also have implications for the allocation of risk at the more aggregated state-level. Quantitatively, the impact of marriage on interstate risk sharing varies over divorce regimes.

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File URL: http://www.econ.jku.at/papers/2008/wp0816.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria in its series Economics working papers with number 2008-16.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jku:econwp:2008_16
Contact details of provider: Fax: +43 732-2468-8238
Web page: http://www.econ.jku.at/

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