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Over-investment in marriage-specific capital

Author

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  • Olivier Donni

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

We consider the decisions of a married couple in a risky environment. The distribution of spouses bargaining power may change as a consequence of new outside opportunities that are offered to them, so that individual consumption may fluctuate over time. This is what we call "bargaining risk". To reduce this risk, the spouses may decide to over-invest in marriage-specific capital (which, by definition, is completely lost in the case of divorce) and thereby limit the attractiveness of spouses outside opportunities. This strategy is shown to be optimal. More surprisingly, over-investment in marriage- specific capital is still an optimal strategy when spouses are confronted to a (small) risk of divorce. This contrasts with the usual intuition.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Donni, 2014. "Over-investment in marriage-specific capital," Post-Print hal-02979677, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02979677
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.002
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    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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